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ABSTRACT A large output gap accompanied by stable inflation close to its 
target calls for further monetary accommodation, but the zero lower bound 
on interest rates has robbed the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of 
the usual tool for its provision. We examine how public statements of FOMC 
intentions—forward guidance—can substitute for lower rates at the zero bound. 
We distinguish between Odyssean forward guidance, which publicly commits 
the FOMC to a future action, and Delphic forward guidance, which merely 
forecasts macroeconomic performance and likely monetary policy actions. 
Others have shown how forward guidance that commits the central bank to 
keeping rates at zero for longer than conditions would otherwise warrant can 
provide monetary easing, if the public trusts it. We empirically characterize 
the responses of asset prices and private macroeconomic forecasts to FOMC 
forward guidance, both before and since the recent financial crisis. Our results 
show that the FOMC has extensive experience successfully telegraphing its 
intended adjustments to evolving conditions, so communication difficulties do 
not present an insurmountable barrier to Odyssean forward guidance. Using 
an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, we investigate 
how pairing such guidance with bright-line rules for launching rate increases 
can mitigate risks to the Federal Reserve's price stability mandate. 
From 
the onset of the financial crisis and through the Great Recession 
and ensuing modest recovery, the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) of the Federal Reserve has commented upon the likely duration 
of monetary policy accommodation in the formal statement that follows 
each of its meetings. In December 2008 it said, "The Committee anticipates 
that weak economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low 
1 
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levels of the federal funds rate for some time." In March 2009, when the 
first round of large-scale purchases of Treasury securities was announced, 
"an extended period" replaced "some time" in the formal statement. The 
August 2011 FOMC statement gave specificity to "an extended period" by 
announcing that the committee expected the funds rate to remain excep 
tionally low until "at least . . . mid-2013." The January 2012 statement 
lengthened the anticipated period of exceptionally low rates even further, 
to "late 2014," language that remained in the March 2012 statement. Such 
communications of monetary authorities' intentions are referred to as for 
ward guidance. 
The nature of this most recent forward guidance by the FOMC is the 
subject of substantial debate. Studies by Paul Krugman (1999) and by Gauti 
Eggertsson and Michael Woodford (2003) before the recent episode and by 
Ivan Werning (2012) more recently suggest that a monetary policymaker 
encountering the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the policy interest rate can 
stimulate current aggregate demand by credibly promising to keep the rate 
at zero longer than required by economic conditions and thereby creating 
an economic boom in the future. One might interpret "late 2014" as such a 
credible promise, but one also might interpret it as merely describing what 
the FOMC's policy reaction function would prescribe if current forecasts 
of sluggish economic activity and low inflation through that date come to 
pass.1 "Late 2014" predicts unusually accommodative policy whenever the 
underlying policy reaction function would dictate an earlier "liftoff" of the 
funds rate from zero given the identical conditioning data. 
Motivated by these competing interpretations of "late 2014," we dis 
tinguish between two kinds of forward guidance. Delphic forward guid 
ance publicly states a forecast of macroeconomic performance and likely 
or intended monetary policy actions based on the policymaker's poten 
tially superior information about future macroeconomic fundamentals 
and its own policy goals.2 Such forward guidance presumably improves 
macroeconomic outcomes by reducing private decisionmakers' uncertainty. 
1. Since one of the authors regularly attends meetings of the FOMC, it may be tempting 
just to ask him this question directly. The vantage point of this paper is a research inquiry: 
how can these questions be answered from the standpoint of economic researchers with only 
publicly available information? 
2. The classical Delphic oracle famously made ambiguous utterances. We do not mean 
"Delphic" in this sense. We use the term simply to describe FOMC statements about the 
future. 
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Importantly, however, it does not publicly commit the policymaker to a 
particular course of action. Odyssean forward guidance, in contrast, does 
publicly commit the policymaker, just as Odysseus committed himself to 
staying on his ship by having himself bound to the mast. Tying one's hands 
in the face of an uncertain future might seem like a foolish sacrifice for no 
apparent gain, but economic fluctuations routinely present opportunities 
for monetary policy to benefit from issuing Odyssean forward guidance. 
The reason is that by so doing, policymakers can change public expecta 
tions of their actions tomorrow in a way that improves macroeconomic 
performance today.3 
Nevertheless, the implementation of Odyssean policy faces a fundamental 
challenge. When the appointed time for action arrives, any beneficial effects 
of the policy's anticipation will be bygones that nothing can change. There 
fore, both the monetary policymaker and the public will at that later time 
prefer a policy that addresses only the present circumstances and ignores 
the beneficial effects of its anticipation on past macroeconomic perfor 
mance. For example, when it comes time to keep an earlier promise to raise 
aggregate demand, the FOMC will be concerned about its price stability 
mandate and, acting as it has always done in normal times, will not want to 
follow through.4 Just as Odysseus anticipated that on hearing the Sirens' song 
he would regret his commitment to stay aboard his ship, so might monetary 
policymakers anticipate regretting their commitment to ease policy. If the 
public understands this and therefore believes that such promises will not be 
kept, they will not have the intended effect. Odysseus could use the rope that 
bound him to the mast to enforce his commitment. Lacking such an enforce 
ment mechanism, monetary policymakers must rely on their reputations for 
accuracy and honesty to make their commitments credible. 
The Odyssean monetary policies elucidated by Krugman, Eggertsson and 
Woodford, and Werning have inspired several recent proposals to provide 
more accommodation at the ZLB. The more aggressive policy alternatives 
that have been proposed include Evans's (2012) state-contingent price-level 
targeting, nominal income targeting as advocated by Christina Romer,5 and 
3. Romer and Romer (2000) and Ellingsen and Soderstrom (2001) characterize forward 
guidance similarly. 
4. This is an example of a time-inconsistent policy, first considered by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977). 
5. Christina D. Romer, "Dear Ben: It's Time for Your Volcker Moment," The New York 
Times, October 29, 2011. 
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conditional economic thresholds for exiting the ZLB as proposed by Evans 
(2011). The main challenge facing the FOMC in implementing any of these 
policies is convincing the public that it will follow through on the promised 
future course of action. This paper sheds light on the FOMC's ability to 
meet this challenge and on the possible benefits of doing so. 
The FOMC has used forward guidance implicitly, through speeches and 
testimony by its members, and explicitly, through formal committee state 
ments, since long before the financial crisis, so the question of whether 
the FOMC can clearly communicate its future policy intentions can be 
addressed empirically. Accordingly, the first part of this paper examines 
data from before and after the crisis, to measure the impact that FOMC 
communications have had on private expectations. We begin by studying 
market responses to FOMC statements, building on prior work by Refet 
Gurkaynak, Brian Sack, and Eric Swanson (2005). Those authors follow 
Kenneth Kuttner (2001) by analyzing changes in prices on federal funds 
rate futures in short windows of time surrounding the release of FOMC 
statements. Using a sample from June 1991 through December 2004, 
Gurkaynak and his coauthors find that FOMC statements are associated 
with significant effects, both on federal funds futures prices and on Trea 
sury yields, that are not due to surprise changes in the federal funds tar 
get itself. That is, their results show that market participants believe that 
FOMC statements contain reliable information about future monetary pol 
icy actions. We verify that these findings continue to hold when the sample 
is extended to July 2007, just before the crisis. 
One might doubt the relevance of these findings for the present situ 
ation, because the attainment of the ZLB has robbed the FOMC of its 
principal policy lever. But evidence exists that the FOMC can still exert 
influence in the presence of a binding ZLB. Focusing on FOMC com 
munications about its recent large-scale asset purchases, known as QE1 
and QE2, Joseph Gagnon and coauthors (2010) and Arvind Krishnamur 
thy and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) provide evidence of signifi 
cant asset price effects since the crisis. To complement these studies 
and provide more assurance that forward guidance unaccompanied by 
material policy action can move asset prices, we apply Gurkaynak and 
his coauthors' methodology to FOMC statements since the crisis and find 
results similar to theirs. 
FOMC actions that influence asset prices are merely means toward the 
end of fulfilling the Federal Reserve's dual mandate of maximum sus 
tainable employment and price stability. To evaluate the contributions of 
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FOMC statements toward this ultimate goal, we examine how revisions to 
the Blue Chip consensus forecasts of the unemployment rate and consumer 
price index (CPI) inflation respond to the policy innovations identified by 
Giirkaynak and others (2005). For the sample period February 1994 to June 
2007, a positive innovation to future federal funds rates is associated with 
decreases in unemployment forecasts for the subsequent 3 quarters and 
with higher forecasts of CPI inflation in the current and subsequent quar 
ters. We never find a statistically significant reaction of either forecast that 
is of the "correct" sign, that is, one that indicates a New Keynesian response 
to an exogenous policy shock. From this we conclude that the monetary 
policy surprises identified with high-frequency data have a substantial Del 
phic component, despite the fact that the methodology of Giirkaynak and 
others inherently controls for publicly known macroeconomic fundamen 
tals. That is, professional forecasters infer that the FOMC's unexpected 
policy adjustments are responses to nonpublic information that the FOMC 
possesses regarding the future strength of the economy.6 We find qualita 
tively similar results for the crisis period, but the estimates are too impre 
cise to allow firm quantitative conclusions. 
The FOMC does not rely solely on postmeeting public statements to 
communicate its policies. To get a broader perspective on the influence of 
FOMC communications on private expectations, we proceed to examine 
monetary policy surprises identified from a simple interest rate rule like 
those of John Taylor (1993, 1999) and David Reifschneider and John Wil 
liams (2000). Using the Blue Chip forecasts and interest rate futures prices 
aggregated to the quarterly level, we estimate such a rule and decompose 
its residual into the part revealed when the spot policy rate is set and the 
parts revealed to the public in the prior 4 quarters. 
We highlight here four results based on data from 1996 through 2007. 
First, the standard deviation of the expected interest rate 4 quarters out 
minus its value from the rule is only 9 basis points (bp). Thus, the rule 
describes medium-run forecasts of FOMC behavior extremely well. Appar 
ently, the FOMC has been successful in communicating its typical behav 
ior to the public. Although this need not reflect an Odyssean commitment, 
it is observationally equivalent to one. Second, the FOMC telegraphs 
6. Such information might reflect the Federal Reserve staff's possibly superior ability to 
process incoming data. It does not have to involve proprietary access to data or information 
held only by the FOMC about its future policy intentions. 
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40 percent of its deviations from the interest rate rule exactly 1 quarter 
in advance and another 40 percent 2 or more quarters in advance. Third, 
the identified forward guidance residuals have much stronger effects on 
asset prices than do surprises of the type described by Gurkaynak and 
others (2005). For example, a 1-bp innovation to next quarter's expected 
federal funds rate moves both the 2-year and the 5-year Treasury rate by 
about 2 bp. The corresponding effects estimated with the methodology 
of Gurkaynak and others are under 1 bp. Fourth, the identified forward 
guidance residuals are negatively correlated with unemployment forecast 
revisions and positively correlated with inflation forecast revisions, just 
like the statement date-based shocks in Gurkaynak and others (2005). 
Apparently, the residuals reflect, at least in part, anticipated deviations 
from the policy rule that nevertheless are motivated by recent news of 
economic fundamentals. Phrased differently, the FOMC's behavior has 
been history dependent: the committee reacts more aggressively to eco 
nomic weakness revealed only shortly before its onset than to weakness 
foreseen 4 quarters in advance. 
The estimated effects of FOMC forward guidance on asset prices and 
private forecasts suggest that the FOMC has had some success in com 
municating its future intentions to the public.7 This suggests that commu 
nication difficulties do not present an insurmountable barrier to monetary 
policy based on Odyssean forward guidance. The second part of our paper 
investigates the consequences of interpreting the "late 2014" statement 
language as Odyssean forward guidance that implements the policy rec 
ommendations of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and others. There are 
legitimate concerns that forward guidance of this kind places the FOMC's 
mandated price stability goal at risk. We consider these concerns by fore 
casting the path of the economy with the present forward guidance and 
subjecting that forecast to two upside risks: higher inflation expectations 
and faster deleveraging by households and firms. 
This policy analysis uses a medium-scale dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model adapted from Justiniano, Giorgio Primiceri, 
and Andrea Tambalotti (2011) at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. 
The model strongly resembles other medium-scale DSGE models in the 
7. Both our inferences of forward guidance and those from the more familiar event-study 
approach use market prices to measure the quantitative content of FOMC communication. In 
standard models the process of communication is transparent and frictionless, so it is tempt 
ing to suppose that the FOMC can fine-tune its statements to achieve any desired market 
impact. However, one must acknowledge frictions in the communication process that make 
market responses to FOMC statements unpredictable to the FOMC itself. 
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literature and is very similar to models used at central banks around the 
world.8 Importantly for our purposes, it embodies the basic mechanisms 
that make forward guidance attractive at the ZLB. 
Evans (2011) has proposed that the FOMC pledge to begin lifting its 
policy rate from zero if either the unemployment rate falls below 7 percent 
or expected inflation over the medium term rises above 3 percent. This "7/3" 
threshold rule is designed to maintain low interest rates even as the economy 
begins expanding on its own (as prescribed by Eggertsson and Woodford 
2003), while providing safeguards against unexpected developments that 
may put the FOMC's price stability mandate in jeopardy. Our policy analy 
sis suggests that such conditioning, if credible, could be helpful in limiting 
the inflationary consequences of a surge in aggregate demand arising from 
an early end to the deleveraging observed since the financial crisis. 
I. FOMC Statements and Private Expectations 
The FOMC's use of forward guidance since long before the financial 
crisis makes it possible to assess empirically its ability to communi 
cate its future policy intentions. In this section we do so by applying 
the methodology of Giirkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005; GSS hence 
forth). They use high-frequency data on prices of federal funds futures 
and Eurodollar futures contracts to measure unanticipated changes in 
expected future spot interest rates associated with FOMC statements. 
Two estimated factors, a target factor that moves the current policy rate 
and a path factor that moves only expected future rates, account for most 
of these changes. GSS show that yields on longer-duration Treasury 
notes respond substantially to the path factor. 
We extend the GSS analysis in three ways. First, we examine the 
responses of yields on corporate bonds to the factors and confirm that a pos 
itive realization of the path factor raises not only expected future policy rates 
but corporate borrowing rates as well. That is, forward guidance influences 
interest rates that are directly relevant for private investment decisions. Sec 
ond, we examine how revisions to professional forecasts of unemployment 
and CPI inflation respond to the factors. If the public and the FOMC were 
equally well informed about macroeconomic fundamentals, then the factors 
must reflect the revelation of FOMC policy preferences. In that case one 
would expect forecast revisions to match the equilibrium response to an 
8. The FOMC's minutes for the June 2011 meeting describe a discussion of DSGE 
models within the Federal Reserve System at that meeting. 
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unanticipated monetary policy shock. Instead, however, we find that the sta 
tistically significant responses all have the sign opposite to that predicted by 
the standard New Keynesian model: unanticipated increases in the path fac 
tor lead to decreases in expected unemployment and increases in expected 
inflation. From this we conclude that professional forecasters believe that 
FOMC policy surprises contain useful and otherwise unavailable macro 
economic information—that is, they have a Delphic component. Third, we 
extend the sample period so as to examine FOMC announcements since 
the onset of the financial crisis in August 2007. Here the relatively small 
sample makes our estimates of professional forecasters' responses to sur 
prise monetary policy moves too imprecise to allow firm conclusions, but 
the estimates of asset price responses remain accurate enough to show that 
they differ little from their precrisis values. 
I.A. Forward Guidance before the Financial Crisis 
Glenn Rudebusch and Williams (2008) describe the modern history of 
explicit forward guidance before the financial crisis. From 1983 to 1999 the 
FOMC's views about the future policy path were put to a vote at each meet 
ing. The vote was on the expected direction of future changes in the stance 
of policy between meetings. However, this information was made public 
only after the following meeting, when it was outdated and presumably of 
limited use to the public. In February 1994 the FOMC began issuing imme 
diately after each meeting a statement describing the current policy stance, 
and in May 1999 it began including explicit language about the future 
stance of policy in these statements. The first of these forward-looking 
statements read in part as follows: "The Committee . . . adopted a directive 
that is tilted toward the possibility of a firming in the stance of monetary 
policy." The language intended to guide expectations has changed over 
time as the FOMC has sought ways of maintaining transparency without 
confusing markets, and as it has adjusted to the evolving policy environ 
ment. But language of one form or another describing the expected future 
stance of policy has come to be a fixture of these statements.9 
9. Here are some examples. At the start of 2000, the direct signals of policy inclinations 
were replaced with language describing the "balance of risks" regarding the FOMC's man 
dated goals of maximum employment and price stability. The August 2003 FOMC statement 
said, "The Committee believes that policy accommodation can be maintained for a consider 
able period." In January 2004 the forward-looking language was "the Committee believes 
that it can be patient in removing its policy accommodation," and that of May 2004 was 
"policy accommodation can be removed at a pace that is likely to be measured." As inflation 
fears rose thereafter, the December 2005 statement included the words "further policy firm 
ing may be needed." 
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When measuring the market impact of FOMC statements, one must 
confront the possibility that their content is more confirming of macro 
economic conditions already known by market participants than revealing 
of adjustments to policy. Failure to control for statements' confirming con 
tent could lead to incorrectly attributing to them outcomes that are in fact 
due to other factors driving revisions to expectations of growth and infla 
tion. GSS overcome this difficulty by studying the behavior of expected 
federal funds rates in symmetric 30- and 60-minute windows surrounding 
the release of FOMC statements. Focusing on these narrow windows keeps 
the economic information available to market participants essentially fixed. 
The within-day data on which GSS rely are unavailable to us after 2004, 
so we extend their work using daily observations of implied future interest 
rates at the market's close from five futures contracts: the current-month 
and 3-month-ahead federal funds futures contracts (with a scale factor to 
account for the timing of FOMC meetings within the month) and the 2-, 
3-, and 4-quarter-ahead Eurodollar futures contracts (adjusted by the dif 
ference between the spot Eurodollar and federal funds rates); to each of 
these we add a risk premium of 1 bp per month.10 Using data from the 
same contracts spanning February 1990 through February 2004, GSS find 
that just two factors explain more than 90 percent of the variation in these 
contracts' prices. Despite the potentially unlimited complexity of monetary 
policy statements, financial markets nonetheless have reacted as if there 
is essentially only one additional degree of information beyond surprise 
changes in the federal funds rate target. By performing a suitable rotation 
of the two factors, GSS show that they can be given "target" and "path" 
interpretations. The target factor accounts for most of the surprise change 
in the current federal funds rate. By construction, the path factor influences 
only expected future rates.11 
We begin our analysis by replicating theirs over a slightly longer time 
sample, February 1990 through June 2007. We have found that many of 
10. Our use of the daily window should not be too problematic, since GSS's results are 
similar when they use the daily window (see their table 1). The short windows studied by 
GSS are mostly relevant for the period before February 1994, when open-market operations 
were sometimes conducted following the release of labor market data on the same day. 
11. GSS show that the path factor is associated with well-known significant changes 
in FOMC statement language. For example, its largest realization in absolute value occurs 
on January 28, 2004, when the federal funds target was not changed but the phrase "policy 
accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period" was replaced with "the Com 
mittee believes it can be patient in removing its policy accommodation." This change in 
language was interpreted by markets as indicating that the FOMC would begin tightening 
policy sooner than previously expected. 
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Table 1. Decomposing the Variance in Changes in Expected Federal Funds Rates, 
1990-2007 and 1994-2007' 
Percent 
Share of variance due to indicated factor 
February 1990-June 2007 February 1994-June 2007 
_ , , . , sample sample 
Federal funds rate _ 
futures contract Target factor Path factor Target factor Path factor 
Current quarter 98 0 97 0 
Next quarter 82 14 74 22 
Two quarters hence 51 47 31 67 
Three quarters hence 36 63 18 81 
Four quarters hence 21 77 7 90 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
a. Expected interest rates are measured using daily federal funds futures prices and Eurodollar futures 
prices as described in the text. Numbers do not sum to 100 because the two factors do not explain all the 
variation in the expected rate changes. 
our results are sensitive to including the observation for September 2001, 
so we omit it from this and all subsequent analysis in this section (as do 
GSS in their online appendix). The first two columns of table 1 report the 
fractions of innovation variance for each interest rate futures contract rate 
that are due to the identified target factor and to the identified path factor 
over this sample period. The path factor accounts for no changes to the cur 
rent quarter's interest rate by construction, and it accounts for only 14 per 
cent of the variance in the interest rates expected for the next quarter. The 
target factor accounts for nearly all of the remaining variance from these 
two contracts. The path and target factors each explain about 50 percent of 
the variance in interest rates expected 2 quarters hence, and the path factor 
accounts for the clear majority of the variance in the two longest contracts. 
Before February 1994 the FOMC did not explicitly announce changes 
in its target for the federal funds rate. Although GSS show that even 
before that date, market participants were able to discern within minutes 
of an open-market operation whether the FOMC had changed its target, 
one might reasonably suspect that little forward guidance came out of 
these earlier FOMC meetings. The second two columns of table 1 report 
the results when we discard these first 4 years. As expected, this change 
in the sample period increases the path factor's importance. 
GSS document substantial positive statistical relationships between 
their identified factors and yields on financial assets. In particular, a pos 
itive 100-bp realization of their target factor raises 2-, 5-, and 10-year 
Treasury yields by 41, 37, and 28 bp, respectively (penultimate column 
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of their table 5). Table 2 reports analogous regressions for the path and 
target factors as we identify them for the two samples. (We normalize the 
target factor loading on the current funds rate and the path factor loading 
on the 4-quarters-ahead futures rate to be unity. GSS use a slightly different 
normalization. The normalization has no impact on statistical significance 
or decomposition of variance.) The table's top panel reports the regressions 
using the 2-, 5-, and 10-year Treasury yields. GSS find that the two factors 
explain 94 percent, 80 percent, and 74 percent of the variance in these rate 
changes, respectively. The two factors we identify have similarly strong 
explanatory power for both samples we consider. For the longer sample 
(first two columns), all of the slopes multiplying the factors are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Their magnitudes are compa 
rable to those reported by GSS, but our path factor slopes are somewhat 
larger and our target factor slopes a bit smaller than theirs. For the sample 
excluding the period without regular post-FOMC meeting statements (last 
two columns), the target factor's slopes are smaller and those of the path 
factor larger than for the longer sample. The table's bottom panel reports 
the results using yields on Aaa/AAA- and Baa/BBB-rated corporate bonds 
with at least 20 years remaining before maturity. We find these to be of 
particular interest because they correspond to interest rates that are directly 
relevant for firms' investment decisions. Surprisingly to us, the target factor 
has no detectable influence on these yields, regardless of which sample we 
use. In contrast, a 100-bp positive path factor realization raises both yields 
by about 30 to 35 bp, depending on the sample used for estimation. 
Our first substantial extension of GSS uses the identified factors and 
observations of private inflation and unemployment expectations to mea 
sure the macroeconomic effects of forward guidance. For this analy 
sis we rely on the Blue Chip Economic Indicators forecast survey. At the 
beginning of each month, Blue Chip solicits projections for key eco 
nomic variables, including quarterly changes in the CPI and the civilian 
unemployment rate, from about 50 private forecasters. From these it com 
piles a "consensus" forecast for each variable, which is then published 
on the 10th of the month. The forecasts cover the previous quarter's data 
(which might not yet be published at the time of the survey) and each quar 
ter in the current and next calendar years. Therefore, the data always report 
a 1-quarter backcast, a current-quarter nowcast, and forecasts for at least 
the next 4 quarters.12 
12. The quarterly unemployment rate is expressed as the average monthly value across 
the quarter's constituent months. 
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For each month we calculate the revisions to the forecasts of unem 
ployment and CPI inflation for the current and next 3 quarters. Virtually 
by construction, these are uncorrelated across time.13 We then regress 
these revisions against the identified target and path factors. Table 3 
reports the estimates (in basis points per positive 1-bp factor realiza 
tion) for both precrisis samples. The first notable result is that the R2s for 
these regressions are far lower than those from the analogous asset price 
regressions in table 2. Since the regressions' residuals account for all 
macroeconomic news arriving in the month except that in FOMC state 
ments, this low explanatory power is expected. 
If surprise FOMC policy announcements represent shocks to the stance 
of monetary policy unrelated to current macroeconomic circumstances, 
then a positive innovation to either factor should raise unemployment and 
lower inflation. Our estimates indicate that the opposite is more typical. For 
the longer sample, the coefficients on the target factor are statistically sig 
nificant and negative for unemployment expectations at all four horizons 
(top panel of table 3). The path factor's coefficients are also all negative, but 
in only one case is the coefficient statistically significant (at the 10 percent 
level). Switching to the shorter sample brings the estimates of the target 
factor's coefficients close to zero and amplifies the negative coefficients on 
the path factor. Only 3 of the 16 estimated coefficients for inflation (bottom 
panel) are negative, and none of these are statistically significant. However, 
the coefficient on the path factor in the current quarter's regression and that 
on the target factor in the next quarter's regression are significant at the 
10 percent and the 5 percent level, respectively, in the later sample. 
The counterintuitive signs of the estimates in table 3 require an expla 
nation. The one we favor interprets the GSS forward guidance as Delphic: 
the public believes that the FOMC has information about macroeconomic 
fundamentals that the public does not, and that monetary policy surprises 
arise from this informational advantage. In that case the forecast revision 
following a positive policy rate innovation encompasses the revelation of 
unexpectedly strong macroeconomic fundamentals as well as the contrac 
tionary effects of the innovation itself. 
LB. Forward Guidance since the Financial Crisis 
The evidence that market participants and professional forecasters 
are influenced by FOMC forward guidance is suggestive for the current 
13. Krane (2011) searches for bias and forecast error predictability in the Blue Chip 
consensus forecasts for GDP growth and finds none. Similarly, we find no evidence that the 
Blue Chip forecasts of inflation and unemployment are seriously deficient. 
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situation, but we hesitate to apply it directly to the present when the ZLB 
has robbed the FOMC of its principal policy tool. Research on monetary 
policy announcements since the onset of the crisis has focused almost 
exclusively on the impact of the FOMC's announcements of large-scale 
asset purchases (LSAPs).14 There is significant evidence that LSAP pol 
icies can alter long-term interest rates. For example, Gagnon and others 
(2010) present an event study of QE1 that documents large reductions 
in interest rates concurrent with LSAP announcements. Krishnamurthy 
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) evaluate the impact on interest rates of 
announcements associated with both QE1 and QE2. They uncover sev 
eral channels through which these announcements have had an impact 
on asset prices and ascribe a major role to their signaling of lower future 
federal funds rates. This suggests that one feature of LSAPs resembles 
forward guidance, and so the findings of Krishnamurthy and Vissing 
Jorgensen (2011) can be interpreted as supporting the view that forward 
guidance has significantly influenced asset prices in the recent period. 
However, the recent impact of "pure" forward guidance, where the pol 
icy action is reflected solely in statement language, remains unclear. 
To shed further light on the impact of forward guidance, we apply 
the GSS methodology to FOMC statements issued since the onset of the 
financial crisis. Table 4 presents our compilation of relevant statements 
and the language in each that we judge most pertinent to forward guid 
ance.15 The list includes the statements following every scheduled and 
unscheduled FOMC meeting since August 2007 (39 in all) as well as the 
November 25, 2008, Board of Governors press release that announced 
the first stage of QE1. (All LSAP announcements since that press release 
have been made in postmeeting FOMC statements.) Although several 
remarks in speeches and testimony by Federal Reserve officials also seem 
to have been interpreted by markets as forward guidance, we exclude 
14. One exception is Wright (2012), who documents the effects of monetary policy 
surprises on long-term interest rates since the attainment of the ZLB. His analysis draws 
on identification by heteroskedasticity and does not distinguish between two factors 
capturing surprises at different horizons over the expected policy path. Swanson and 
Williams (2012) also discuss the effects of FOMC announcements on long-term yields, 
but they focus on the responses of medium- and longer-term interest rates to macro 
economic news. 
15. We omit the large number of Federal Reserve press releases focused on programs 
designed to promote the smooth functioning of credit markets because they did not concern 
the traditional focus of countercyclical monetary policy. 
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Table 4. Forward Guidance in Official FOMC Statements, 
August 2007-December 2011a 
Federal 
funds target 
Date of statement rate (%) Relevant language 
August 7, 2007 5.25 
August 17, 2007 5.25 
September 18, 2007b 4.75 
October 31, 2007 4.50 
December 11, 2007 4.25 
January 22, 2008" 3.50 
January 30, 2008 3.00 
March 18, 2008 2.25 
April 30, 2008 2.00 
June 25, 2008 2.00 
August 5, 2008 2.00 
September 16, 2008 2.00 
October 8, 2008b 1.50 
October 29, 2008 1.00 
November 25, 2008b 0-0.25 
(press release) 
". . . the Committee's predominant policy concern 
remains the risk that inflation will fail to moderate 
as expected." 
". . . the downside risks to growth have increased 
appreciably." 
"Developments in financial markets . . . have increased 
the uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook." 
". . . the upside risks to inflation roughly balance the 
downside risks to growth." 
"Recent developments . . . have increased the uncer 
tainty surrounding the outlook for economic growth 
and inflation." 
"Appreciable downside risks to growth remain." 
. . downside risks to growth remain." 
Same as previous 
"The substantial easing of monetary policy to date, 
combined with ongoing measures to foster market 
liquidity, should help to promote moderate growth 
over time and to mitigate risks to economic activity." 
"Although downside risks to growth remain, they ap 
pear to have diminished somewhat, and the 
upside risks to inflation and inflation expectations 
have increased." 
"Although downside risks to growth remain, the upside 
risks to inflation are also of significant concern to 
the Committee." 
"The downside risks to growth and the upside risks 
to inflation are both of significant concern to the 
Committee." 
"Incoming economic data suggest that the pace of 
economic activity has slowed markedly in recent 
months. Moreover, the intensification of financial 
market turmoil is likely to exert additional restraint 
on spending, partly by further reducing the ability of 
households and businesses to obtain credit. Inflation 
has been high, but the Committee believes that the 
decline in energy and other commodity prices and the 
weaker prospects for economic activity have reduced 
the upside risks to inflation." 
. . downside risks to growth remain." 
". .. purchases [of $100 billion of GSEs and 
$500 billion of MBSs] are expected to take place 
over several quarters." 
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Table 4. Forward Guidance in Official FOMC Statements, 
August 2007-December 2011' (Continued) 
Date of statement 
Federal 
funds target 
rate (%) Relevant language 
December 16, 2008 
January 28, 2009 
March 18, 2009 
(QE1 announce 
ment) 
April 29, 2009 
June 24, 2009 
0-0.25 .. the Committee anticipates that weak economic 
conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low 
levels of the federal funds rate for some time. The 
focus of the Committee's policy going forward will 
be to ... stimulate the economy through open market 
operations and other measures that sustain the size of 
the Federal Reserve's balance sheet at a high level.... 
The Committee is also evaluating the potential benefits 
of purchasing longer-term Treasury securities." 
0-0.25 "The Committee continues to anticipate that economic 
conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low 
levels of the federal funds rate for some time. The 
Committee also is prepared to purchase longer 
term Treasury securities if evolving circumstances 
indicate that such transactions would be particularly 
effective in improving conditions in private credit 
markets." 
0-0.25 .. the Committee will maintain the target range for 
the federal funds rate at 0 to V* percent and anticipates 
that economic conditions are likely to warrant excep 
tionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an 
extended period. The Committee sees some risk that 
inflation could persist for a time below rates that 
best foster economic growth and price stability in 
the longer term. .. . The Committee decided today 
to increase the size of the Federal Reserve's balance 
sheet further by purchasing up to an additional 
$750 billion of [MBSs], bringing its total purchases of 
these securities to up to $1.25 trillion this year, and to 
increase its purchases of [GSE] debt this year by up to 
$100 billion to a total of up to $200 billion... . The 
Committee decided to purchase up to $300 billion 
of longer-term Treasury securities over the next six 
months." 
0-0.25 ". . . Committee sees some risk that inflation could per 
sist for a time below rates that best foster economic 
growth and price stability in the longer term. . . . 
Economic conditions are likely to warrant excep 
tionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an 
extended period." 
0-0.25 ".. . economic conditions are likely to warrant excep 
tionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an 
extended period. . . . The Committee expects that 
inflation will remain subdued for some time." 
(icontinued) 
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Table 4. Forward Guidance in Official FOMC Statements, 
August 2007-December 2011a (Continued) 
Federal 
funds target 
Date of statement rate (%) Relevant language 
August 12, 2009 0-0.25 "Although economic activity is likely to remain weak 
for a time, the Committee continues to anticipate that 
policy actions to stabilize financial markets and institu 
tions, fiscal and monetary stimulus, and market forces 
will contribute to a gradual resumption of sustainable 
economic growth in a context of price stability. . . . 
Substantial resource slack is likely to dampen cost 
pressures, and the Committee expects that inflation 
will remain subdued for some time." 
September 23, 2009 0-0.25 . . economic conditions are likely to warrant excep 
tionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an 
extended period. .. . [MBS and GSE purchases will 
finish by the] end of the first quarter of 2010." 
November 4, 2009 0-0.25 ". . . economic conditions ... are likely to warrant 
exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for 
an extended period [and the Committee will com 
plete purchases of GSE debt of about $175 billion]." 
December 16, 2009 0-0.25 ". . . economic conditions ... are likely to warrant 
exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for 
an extended period." 
January 27, 2010 0-0.25 Same as previous 
March 16,2010 0-0.25 Same as previous 
April 28, 2010 0-0.25 Same as previous 
June 23, 2010 0-0.25 Same as previous 
August 10, 2010 0-0.25 Same as previous, plus "the Committee will keep con 
stant the Federal Reserve's holdings of securities at 
their current level by reinvesting principal payments 
from agency debt and agency [MBSs] in longer-term 
Treasury securities." 
September 21, 2010 0-0.25 Same as June 23, plus "The Committee also will 
maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal 
payments from its securities holdings." 
November 3, 0-0.25 Same as previous, plus "In addition, the Committee 
2010 (QE2 intends to purchase a further $600 billion of longer 
announcement) term Treasury securities by the end of the second 
quarter of 2011." 
December 14, 2010 0-0.25 Same as previous 
January 26, 2011 0-0.25 Same as previous 
March 15,2011 0-0.25 Same as previous 
April 27, 2011 0-0.25 Same as previous 
June 22, 2011 0-0.25 Same as previous 
August 9, 2011 0-0.25 ".. . economic conditions ... are likely to warrant 
exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate at 
least through mid-2013." 
September 21, 2011 0-0.25 Same as previous 
November 2, 2011 0-0.25 Same as previous 
December 13, 2011 0-0.25 Same as previous 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System website at www.federalreserve.gov/news 
events/press/monetary/2012monetary.htm. 
a. The November 28, 2008, press release was issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System. All other statements were issued by the FOMC. GSE = government-sponsored enterprise; MBS = 
mortgage-backed security. 
b. Statement was issued between regularly scheduled FOMC meetings. 
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these from our analysis, since it is difficult to find an objective criterion 
for including any given instance.16 
Mimicking our analysis of the precrisis period, we estimate factors from 
changes in expected future federal funds rates between the close of business 
the day before and the day of each of the announcements listed in table 4. 
Because the horizon over which forward guidance is issued seems to be 
longer since the crisis than it was during the precrisis period, we exam 
ine the behavior of seven futures contracts that pin down the expected 
path of the federal funds rate over the next year and a half without over 
lapping: the current-month and 3-month-ahead federal funds futures 
contracts (again with a scale factor to account for the timing of FOMC 
meetings within the month) and the 2-, 3-, 4-, 5-, and 6-quarter-ahead 
Eurodollar futures contracts (again adjusted by the difference between 
the spot Eurodollar and federal funds rates). As before, we also adjust 
all rates for an assumed risk premium of 1 bp per month. Just as in the 
precrisis period, two factors explain most of the variability in the futures 
data. Henceforth we focus on the first two factors after they have been 
rotated as in GSS. 
Figure 1 is a scatterplot of the path factor against changes in the 10-year 
Treasury yield for the 40 dates listed in table 4. We distinguish statements 
containing announcements of LSAPs from other statements, and the state 
ments most closely associated with QE1 and QE2 (March 18, 2009, and 
November 3, 2010, respectively) are labeled. The most striking feature of 
figure 1 is how much of an outlier the March 18,2009, announcement is. On 
that date the 10-year yield fell (as intended) 51 bp while the path factor rose 
32 bp. Markets interpreted the FOMC's announcement as indicating that the 
recovery would come sooner than previously thought and that, consequently, 
liftoff in the federal funds rate from the ZLB would come earlier than pre 
viously anticipated; the 2-quarter-ahead futures contract rose 60 bp from the 
day before. In contrast, the response to the QE2 announcement appears very 
much like the responses to the other FOMC announcements, which indicate 
a positive relationship between the path factor and changes in the 10-year yield. 
Indeed, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011, p. 217) find that "the 
16. Probably the most relevant instances in this regard are speeches on December 1, 
2008, and August 27, 2010, by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, which were inter 
preted by markets as opening the door to the first and second round of large-scale purchases 
of Treasury securities, respectively. With the exception of the December 1, 2008, speech, 
our compilation includes every QE1 and QE2 date employed in Krishnamurthy and Vissing 
Jorgensen's (2011) event study. 
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Figure 1. Path Factor and Changes in 10-YearTreasury Yields on FOMC Statement Dates 
LSAP Announcements 
Other FOMC Statements 
• QE1 3/18/2009 
QE2 11/3/2010 
• * «•*•. 
* 
• .* • • » 
I *• » 
^T -40 -20 
Change in 10-Year Note 
20 
Source: Haver Analytics/Federal Reserve H.15 and authors' calculations based on Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange data. 
main effect on corporate bonds and [mortgage-backed securities] in QE2 
appears to have been through a signaling channel, whereby financial markets 
interpreted QE as signaling lower federal funds rates going forward." 
The apparently very different response to the March 18, 2009, QE1 
announcement motivates us to exclude it from the remainder of our fac 
tor analysis. 
Table 5 reports the fractions of variance in changes to expected future 
federal funds rates explained by the target and by the path factor estimated 
from all the announcements in table 4 except the outlier associated with 
QE1. The target factor dominates the variation in the current-quarter rate 
and the 1-, 2-, and 3-quarter-ahead rates, whereas the path factor explains 
the majority of variation in the three longer rates and negligible shares of 
the three shortest contracts. This pattern is broadly similar to that for the 
precrisis period reported in table 1. The main difference is that here the 
path factor dominates only those changes in expected interest rates that are 
4 or more quarters ahead. 
Table 6 reports asset price regression estimates analogous to those of 
table 2, based on the postcrisis factors. Since this sample is smaller, the 
estimates' associated standard errors are larger. These estimates strongly 
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Table 5. Decomposing the Variance in Changes in Expected Federal Funds Rates, 
August 2007-December 201V 
Percent 
Share of variance due to 
indicated factor 
Federal funds rate futures contract Target factor Path factor 
Current quarter 94 0 
Next quarter 98 0 
Two quarters hence 93 3 
Three quarters hence 57 35 
Four quarters hence 44 53 
Five quarters hence 31 68 
Six quarters hence 16 79 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
a. Expected interest rates are measured using daily federal funds futures prices and Eurodollar futures 
prices as described in the text. Numbers do not sum to 100 because the two factors do not explain all the 
variation in the expected rate changes. 
Table 6. Regressions Estimating Asset Price Responses to Target and Path Factors, 
August 2007-December 2011" 
Asset Target factor Path factor Adjusted R? 
Treasuries 
2 years to maturity 
5 years to maturity 














Source: Authors' regressions. 
a. Each row in each panel reports coefficients from a regression of daily changes in yields of the indicated 
asset on the two factors. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance 
at the *10 percent, **5 percent, and ***1 percent level. 
b. Both samples include only bonds with 20 or more years to maturity. 
resemble those from before the crisis. Both factors have a large positive 
influence on the 2- and 5-year yields, and the path factor substantially influ 
ences the 10-year Treasury yield and yields on seasoned Aaa/AAA- and 
Baa/BBB-rated corporate bonds. Given the disparity in economic conditions 
between the pre- and postcrisis sample periods, the similarity of forward 
guidance effects on asset prices is a striking finding. 
This content downloaded from 128.59.154.119 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 16:18:17 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
22 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2012 
Table 7. Regressions Estimating Private Forecast Responses to Target and Path Factors, 
August 2007-December 201V 
Forecast Target factor Path factor Adjusted R2 
Unemployment rate 
Current quarter -0.21 0.01 0.02 
(0.19) (0.31) 
Next quarter -0.29 0.02 0.03 
(0.26) (0.47) 
2 quarters hence -0.33 0.11 0.04 
(0.34) (0.62) 
3 quarters hence -0.35 0.15 0.03 
(0.39) (0.73) 
CPI inflation 
Current quarter 1.80 2.05 0.07 
(1.82) (4.17) 
Next quarter 0.53 0.44 0.04 
(0.64) (1.43) 
2 quarters hence -0.01 -0.02 0.00 
(0.12) (0.27) 
3 quarters hence 0.07 0.23 0.03 
(0.11) (0.29) 
Source: Authors' regressions. 
a. Each row in each panel reports coefficients from a regression of changes in monthly forecasts of either 
the unemployment rate or CPI inflation on the two factors. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table 7 reports estimates for the forecast innovation regressions using 
the postcrisis data. The estimated standard errors greatly exceed those 
from the analogous regressions estimated with precrisis data (table 3), 
so that none of the reported coefficients are statistically significant. 
Although we conclude that our regression estimates of the effects of 
forward guidance on macroeconomic expectations since the financial 
crisis are too imprecise to allow strong quantitative conclusions, the 
estimates are broadly consistent with those from the precrisis period. 
II. Forward Guidance through an Interest Rate Rule 
The event-study approach used above isolates "pure" forward guidance 
associated with distinct policy announcements from other monetary policy 
actions, but it fails to identify any forward guidance communicated through 
other channels. In this section we present a new and complementary meth 
odology that identifies forward guidance communicated through all the 
channels available to the FOMC. This approach builds on the long-standing 
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practice of summarizing monetary policy with a parsimonious rule for setting 
the policy rate. By applying such a rule both to actual policy decisions and 
to observations of private expectations, we are able to identify consensus 
expectations of how the FOMC will deviate from the monetary policy rule 
at a specific date in the future. 
The empirical implementation of our methodology inserts the Blue 
Chip forecasts and interest rate futures prices examined above, aggre 
gated to quarterly frequency, into an interest rate rule with two lags of 
the interest rate and measures of the unemployment gap and inflation. 
The rule's novelty lies in its residual, which sums components gradu 
ally revealed to the public up to 4 quarters before the policy action. The 
interest rate futures and professional forecasts together are sufficient to 
identify these forward guidance shocks. For the period 1996Q1 through 
2007Q2, the estimated rule describes the 4-quarter-ahead expectation 
of the interest rate very well: the standard deviation of the 4-quarter 
ahead forward guidance shock is only 9 bp. The standard deviation of 
the interest rate rule's total residual (which sums the forward guidance 
shocks with a traditional unanticipated policy shock) is 30 bp. However, 
the standard deviation of the anticipated component is 28 bp. That is, the 
Federal Reserve successfully telegraphs most departures from the inter 
est rate rule in advance. 
The forward guidance shocks we identify from the interest rate rule 
differ from the statement date-based shocks of GSS in some ways and 
resemble them in others. The most notable difference is their factor 
structure. The contemporaneous policy shock and the four forward guid 
ance shocks revealed every quarter have a single factor that explains 
most of the 4-quarter-ahead forward guidance but much less at closer 
horizons. A positive realization of this factor speeds up the usual inter 
est rate changes following a contemporaneous monetary policy shock, 
so we call it the policy acceleration factor. The FOMC seems to have 
used this factor heavily during the 2001 recession and in its aftermath. 
The similarities between GSS-style forward guidance shocks and those 
measured with an interest rate rule become apparent when we calculate 
their effects on asset prices and macroeconomic forecasts. Positive for 
ward guidance shocks raise both Treasury and corporate bond yields. 
By construction, the interest rate rule accounts for the FOMC's typi 
cal responses to varying economic fundamentals as measured by infla 
tion and the unemployment gap. Nevertheless, regressions analogous 
to those in table 3 indicate that the same anticipated deviations from 
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this rule affect unemployment and inflation forecasts with the "wrong" 
sign, just as do the statement date-based GSS shocks. We interpret these 
results as arising from the FOMC adjusting policy quickly when revisions 
to macroeconomic expectations catch it "behind the curve." 
11.A. Rule-Based Measurement of Forward Guidance 
We consider interest rate rules for the average policy rate over quarter t, 
r„ of the following form: 
(D r, = H + P,'",, + P/,-2 
M 
+ (1-P. -P2)(<Mt, + <t>A) + 2> • j-0 
The variables n, and Ti, are the policy-relevant measures of the inflation rate 
and the unemployment gap (the difference between the unemployment rate 
and a measure of the economy's non-accelerating-inflation, or "natural," 
unemployment rate). Parameters p,, p2, ()>_, and (j)„ determine the degree of 
interest smoothing and how the policy rate responds to typical changes in 
macroeconomic conditions. 
The distinguishing feature of equation 1 is the last term, which involves 
the M + 1 disturbances, vHJ for j - 0. 1,,M. The first of these, v,0, is 
the monetary policy disturbance that appears in conventional interest rate 
rules. It captures the Federal Reserve's response to extraordinary events, 
such as the September 11 terrorist attacks or the 1997 Asian currency cri 
sis, that warrant a rapid but temporary deviation from the normal policy 
prescription. The remaining disturbances are forward guidance shocks, 
because they are revealed to the public before they are applied to the inter 
est rate rule. The public sees vtj in quarter t, and the FOMC applies it to 
the rule j quarters hence. We gather all of the shocks revealed in quarter t 
into the vector v, = (v,0, v( l,.. ., v,M). Each realization of v, influences the 
expected path of interest rates. To identify the forward guidance shocks, we 
wish to map revisions to expectations, which are uncorrected over time by 
construction, onto realizations of v,; so we assume that v, is also uncorre 
cted over time. That is, we assume that the elements of v, are news relative 
to the public information set at the end of t - 1. For sufficiently large M 
and under rational expectations, this can be done without loss of general 
ity.17 Although v, is uncorrected over time, its elements may be correlated 
17. The reason is that a time-series variable at time t always can be decomposed into the 
sum of its expected value based on information available ait-\ and an orthogonal innovation. 
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with each other. Allowing for this correlation admits the possibility that the 
FOMC provides information on multiple future quarters' monetary policy 
shocks in the same communication. 
The practice of including exogenous shocks to the interest rate is com 
monplace. Our specification differs from conventional interest rate rules 
only in the assumption that the public observes some of the interest rate 
shocks before their implementation. The most similar recent work is that of 
Stefan Laseen and Lars Svensson (2011), who propose modeling forward 
guidance with an interest rate rule as we do when calculating the equilib 
rium of a New Keynesian model. 
One can recover v, using data on private expectations of unemployment, 
inflation, and the federal funds rate with values of p„ p2, (j)„, and <j)v in hand. 
Here and henceforth, conditional expectations at quarter t are defined in 
terms of information at the beginning of the quarter.18 For any variable x, 
we denote its realization in quarter t with x,. Then we use the notation x[ 
to denote the time t-j conditional expectation of variable xr Since not all 
variables dated t are known by economic agents at the start of the quarter 
they are realized, the "nowcast" jc° does not necessarily equal the realized 
x,. For example, r° is the expectation at the beginning of quarter t of the 
quarter's average policy rate, which can clearly change over the quarter. 
If x is not even revealed to the public during the quarter of its realization, 
then the "backcast" x~' also might not equal x,. The unemployment rate 
provides a relevant example. Its backcast differs from its realized value 
because the time taken for its tabulation delays its release. 
To measure v, MM, suppose that the public expects the FOMC to follow 
equation 1 on average. Then, taking expectations given information at the 
start of period t - M + 1 yields 
(2) r,"'1 = (0. + p,r""2 + p 2r,f2"3 
+ (1 - Pi " P: )(<!>Jf"1 + <fr.fi,"-1) + . 
The residual term in equation 2 equals v,_MM because the expected value 
E,_m+1[v,;] = 0 for j = 0, . . . , M 
- 1. Thus, v,_MM equals the deviation of 
the expected interest rate M — 1 quarters ahead from its value dictated by 
the interest rate rule's expected value. To recover the other errors, we take 
18. This conforms to the timing convention used for the Blue Chip macroeconomic 
expectations data. 
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expectations of equation 1 at two adjacent dates and difference the results. 
For 0 <j < M we obtain 
(3) rJ-'-r/ = p, (rJ~f p2 (rJ~l 
- 
r>:22) 
+(! - p, - p2)[l(sr' - *;) + <t>u("r' -«/)]+v(.w. 
Equation 3 shows that vHJ equals the change within quarter t—j in the 
expected interest rate for quarter t corrected for the change in the interest 
rate rule's expected value arising from revisions in private expectations 
of inflation and unemployment. This disturbance embodies expected 
deviations from "typical" monetary policy. Forward guidance influences 
vHj when the FOMC communicates a prospective change in its short 
run policy goals with or without a credible Odyssean commitment. The 
anticipated residuals might also arise from external factors omitted from 
the rule, but only to the extent that they affect the policy rate through 
channels other than the forecasts of the unemployment gap and inflation 
that already appear in the rule. How much weight is given to a condi 
tioning variable when constructing a forecast depends on the prevailing 
economic conditions. For example, before the increase in foreign trade 
associated with globalization, there was less need to pay attention to 
foreign inflation and the exchange rate than there is today. This does not 
necessarily mean that the policy rule incorrectly omits foreign inflation 
or the exchange rate, because these variables are an input into agents' 
forecasts. 
II.B. Estimation 
Implementing this methodology requires observations of private expec 
tations and the estimation of p, p„ p2, (|>„, and <j)„. The Blue Chip consensus 
forecasts give us and ji;.1, (backcasts), u'' and Jt° (nowcasts), and u{+j and 
K'l+j for y = 1, . . ., 4 (forecasts). In March and October, Blue Chip survey 
participants report forecasts of each variable's average value 7 to 11 years 
after the current calendar year. We use the most recently published con 
sensus long-run forecast for the unemployment rate as a measure of each 
quarter's natural rate of unemployment, u*. From this we construct the 
expected unemployment gap in quarter t+j as u{ = u\ - u*. Our Blue Chip 
data contain observations for the period 1989Q2 through 2011Q4. 
Our implementation of the interest rate rule employs averages of the 
expected unemployment gap and expected inflation over the previous, cur 
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1 v , 
J j—1 
Here we have abused our notation by supposing that u, and n, are realized 
at the end of quarter t even though they depend on information available 
"at the beginning" of quarter t + 1. We can construct forecasts of u, and n, 
from the Blue Chip data up to 3 quarters ahead, so we set M in equation 1 
equal to 4. That is, we assume that the process of communicating forward 
guidance begins 4 quarters before the policy decision in question. 
Although the Blue Chip data contain forecasts of the federal funds rate, 
we prefer to base our measures of expected interest rates on the futures 
market prices used in section I from each quarter's final trading day. Our 
estimation uses only data from the period in which federal funds futures 
have been actively traded in large volume, which James Hamilton and 
others (2011) identify as beginning sometime in 1994. Because the estima 
tion requires lags, we begin our sample with the forecasts of interest rates 
that prevailed in 1996Q1.19 These prices give us the interest rates that our 
procedure requires when M equals 4: r,°, r,\ ..., r,5. The other observations 
required to calculate v, are u°, ..., u] and ..., ft,3. We can calculate 
these with the backcast, nowcast, and four quarterly forecasts in the Blue 
Chip data. 
One frequent approach to estimating the parameters of an interest rate rule 
simply assumes that the autoregressive terms in equation 1 sufficiently cap 
ture the interest rate's serial correlation, so that the policy shock is serially 
uncorrelated and ordinary least squares estimation can be employed. This 
assumption fails if past forward guidance influences the unemployment gap 
and inflation, so we require an alternative estimator. We turn to a generalized 
19. Beginning the sample in 1996Q1 also excludes an outlying observation from the 
Eurodollar futures market in 1994Q4 from our analysis. In that quarter the Eurodollar rate 
for delivery in 1995Q4 (averaged across that quarter's months) rose from 6.7 percent to 
8.0 percent. However, it had returned to 6.5 percent by the end of 1995Q1. Such large 
changes in expected future interest rates were common in the early 1990s but occurred much 
less frequently in our sample period. 
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method of moments (GMM) implementation of an instrumental variables 
strategy. From the Blue Chip data we can calculate wf and Ttf. These, 
and rf]1 are valid instruments for v(0, v,_u, . . . , v,_MM because those mon 
etary policy shocks are all revealed after the beginning of quarter t - M. 
Therefore, we can construct a valid GMM estimator based on the popula 
tion moment conditions 
e[&(y)®z,] = o. 
Here, y= (p, p„ p2, (j)K, <j>„) is the parameter vector, g,(-) is a function that 
takes the parameter values and returns the vector (v^, v,_,,l, . . . , v,_MW), 
and Z, = (uf, n", r"~22, r™]') is the vector of instruments. With M — 4, this 
provides 16 moment restrictions to estimate 4 parameters. 
This moment condition underlying our GMM estimator depends on the 
assumption that our interest rate rule omits no relevant information known 
in quarter t - M. This assumption would be violated if the FOMC gave 
forward guidance more than 4 quarters in advance. In that case the value of 
v,4 inferred using the interest rate rule's correct parameter values should be 
correlated with the instruments in Z,. The "considerable period" language 
provides one obvious potential example of such long-term forward guid 
ance. The relevant part of the August 12, 2003, statement that introduced 
it reads 
The Committee judges that, on balance, the risk of inflation becoming undesir 
ably low is likely to be the predominant concern for the foreseeable future. In 
these circumstances, the Committee believes that policy accommodation can be 
maintained for a considerable period. 
The statement's emphasis on anticipated inflation leads us to read this as 
Delphic rather than Odyssean, so we expect it to have operated through the 
interest rate rule rather than through its residuals. We can think of no other 
concrete examples of long-term forward guidance of any sort during our 
sample period, so we believe any biases from choosing M to conform with 
the Blue Chip forecast horizon to be small.20 
As noted above, our estimation sample begins in 1996Q1. We con 
sider the crisis period that arguably began in 2007Q3 to be unique, and 
20. A violation of our moment condition could also arise from mismeasurement of pri 
vate expectations. If the Blue Chip survey measures equal the public's true expectations 
summed with a classical measurement error, then the measurement errors contribute to g(y). 
This biases our GMM estimator only to the extent that the same errors influence the mea 
sured values of u* and k* in Zr 
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so we end our estimation sample with 2007Q2. The estimated interest 
rate rule is 
r = -0.05 + 1.60 x r(l 
- 0.66 x rt_2 




0.94) x 1.10 u, + (1-0.94) 
(0.28) 
4 
X 2.32 Tt, +XV, jr 
(0.18) 
Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors appear 
below each estimate in parentheses. The estimates' associated J statistic is 
very small (0.25), so the estimates clearly pass the test of overidentifying 
restrictions. 
Two features of the interest rate rule are worth noting. First, we find an 
important role for second-order autoregressive dynamics. This gives the 
interest rate's response to a one-time innovation (holding u, and if, fixed) 
a hump shape: monetary policy adjustments start small, grow, and persist. 
Second, the estimated rule satisfies the Taylor principle that the long-run 
interest rate rises more than one for one with a persistent increase in infla 
tion. The standard error on this coefficient is small enough to comfortably 
exclude the possibility that this arises only from sampling error. 
II.C. How Well Does the Public Forecast Deviations 
from the Interest Rate Rule? 
Given the estimated parameter values, we follow the procedure pre 
sented above to recover the history of v, from the available data. The stan 
dard deviations of the forward guidance shocks by horizon are 12, 20, 13, 
11, and 9 bp for v,0 through v,4, respectively. As noted above, the fact that 
the 4-quarter-ahead forward guidance shock v,4 has such a small standard 
deviation suggests that the estimated rule summarizes medium-run expec 
tations of the federal funds rate very well. We can use these estimates to 
calculate a variance decomposition of the interest rate rule's intercept.21 
Overall, it appears that the FOMC communicates about 40 percent of the 
monetary policy variance in the quarter before its realization and another 
40 percent in the 1 to 3 quarters before then. 
21. Although the elements of v, are correlated with each other, we assume that its real 
izations are independent over time. Therefore, the five shocks contributing to the interest rate 
rule's intercept in a given quarter are mutually independent. 
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Figure 2. The Interest Rate Rule's Residual and Its Forward Guidance Component, 
1996-2007' 
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Source: Authors' calculations, 
a. Shading indicates the 2001 recession. 
Figure 2 gives a visual perspective on this decomposition. It plots the 
composite residual for the interest rate rule ZU v,_jj as well as its forward 
guidance component, which simply drops the contemporaneous shock v,0. 
Overall, the two series track each other quite closely. Indeed, their sample 
correlation is 0.9. At the onset of the 2001 recession, however, the two 
series differ by 62 bp, reflecting the well-known sudden reversal of the 
monetary policy stance at that date. In the second quarter of 2001, the dif 
ference is 37 bp. Two events that do not show up with particularly large 
values of v, 0 are the Asian financial crisis and September 11. The estimate 
of v1997Q30 is only -0.8 bp. It turns out that markets anticipated during the 
previous quarter most of the monetary policy accommodation provided in 
that quarter. Following September 11, the FOMC increased accommoda 
tion only in 2001Q4, because the Federal Reserve concentrated on main 
taining the orderly functioning of financial markets in the final weeks of 
2001Q3. Nevertheless, market participants anticipated this move, so it 
shows up in v200|Q3|, estimated at -85 bp. 
Since each realization of v, moves the entire expected path of interest 
rates, it is reasonable to suppose that its elements correlate with each other. 
Indeed, such correlation underlies the factor analysis of GSS. The sample 
correlation matrix is as follows: 
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V,0 v„ VU V,3 
VM 0.02 
V,.2 -0.05 0.22 
Vf,3 -0.32 0.03 -0.17 
V,.4 -0.32 -0.26 0.22 0.16 
The fact that v,0 is negatively correlated with both v,3 and v,4 suggests that 
the public expects some "last-minute" monetary policy adjustments to be 
reversed in the relatively near future. The other forward guidance shocks 
are uncorrelated with v,0, and they display relatively low correlations with 
each other. 
II.D. Factor Analysis 
Although the correlations among the five shocks contributing to the 
interest rate rule's intercept are not large, GSS's successful use of factor 
analysis motivates us to investigate how a factor model explains them. The 
negative correlations of v,0 with v(3 and vt4 hint at a single factor structure 
in which the factor "tilts" the monetary policy shocks, providing accom 
modation today while promising to take it away later. We investigate this 
impression by estimating 
v = Af, + et. 
Here A is a 5 x 1 matrix of factor loadings,/, is a scalar factor with a mean 
of zero and variance of 1, and e, is a 5 x 1 vector of mutually independent 
"idiosyncratic" errors. 
The maximum-likelihood estimates of the factor loadings from this 
model are 5, 6, 4, -3, and -7 basis points for v,0 through v,4, respectively. 
These estimates reveal that the factor does indeed tilt the path of monetary 
accommodation: a 1-standard-deviation negative realization lowers the 
interest rate rule's intercept by about 5 bp for each of the next 3 quarters 
and increases it by about the same amount for the following 2 quarters. 
The factor model's remaining parameters describe the standard deviations 
of the idiosyncratic errors in er These estimates—11, 19, 13, 10, and 6 for 
v(0 through v,4, respectively—show that the factor accounts for about 
15 percent of the variance of v, 0, about 10 percent of the variance of v, „ 
v,2, and v, 3, and about 60 percent of the variance of v,4. That is, the factor 
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Figure 3. Direct Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks on the Interest Rate 
Quarters after initial impulse 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
accounts for most of 4-quarter-ahead forward guidance but leaves most 
forward guidance issued at shorter horizons unexplained. 
Figure 3 plots the direct interest rate effects (that is, omitting any pos 
sible endogenous responses of inflation or unemployment) over 9 quarters 
of a 1-standard-deviation shock to the factor. For comparison, we also plot 
the response to a standard contemporaneous impulse that initially lowers 
the interest rate by the same amount (5 bp). As dictated by the second 
order autoregressive parameters, the interest rate falls for 3 quarters after 
the standard contemporaneous impulse and then begins a slow rise back 
to its mean. The interest rate also falls for 3 quarters following the factor 
shock, but it falls much more relative to the initial response. Thereafter 
the impulse's effects dissipate quickly: after 9 quarters the interest rate has 
returned to its mean. To us, these responses suggest labeling this factor 
"policy acceleration." When the factor equals zero, policy adjustments pro 
ceed at their normal pace. A negative realization increases the speed of the 
interest rate's decline and recovery, whereas positive realizations increase 
the speed of impact of contractionary policy. 
Figure 4 plots over time the identified policy acceleration factor scaled 
by its impact on the current interest rate. This measure achieved its maxi 
mum value of 9 bp in 1999Q2, although its value in the next quarter almost 
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Figure 4. Estimated Policy Acceleration Factor, 1996-2007 
Basis points 
Source: Authors' calculations, 
a. Shading indicates the 2001 recession. 
exactly offset this promised accelerated stimulus. Its minimum of-21 bp 
occurred in the wake of the 2001 recession, in 2002Q2. In that quarter the 
1-, 2-, and 3-quarter-ahead forecasts of the unemployment rate all rose 
30 bp. (For a point of comparison, these revisions' sample standard errors 
are 17, 20, and 21 bp, respectively.) Its other large and negative realizations 
occurred during the 2001 recession itself, when the upward unemployment 
forecast revisions were even larger. It appears that the FOMC success 
fully signaled its intention to accelerate accommodation following adverse 
unemployment news in 2001 and 2002. 
I I.E. Asset Price and Forecast Responses to Forward Guidance Shocks 
Identified from an Interest Rate Rule 
One clear virtue of the GSS path factor is its documented impacts on 
asset prices that are relevant for private decisions. We now examine the 
impact on asset prices of the forward guidance shocks identified from the 
interest rate rule by regressing the same financial variables used in table 2 on 
them. Since our data are quarterly, we measure bond yields and the stock 
market index on the quarter's final trading day. The changes in these from 
the previous quarter are our dependent variables. For independent variables 
we use a constant and all five of the v shocks. Table 8 reports the estimated 
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Table 8. Regressions Estimating Asset Price Responses to Forward Guidance Shocks 
Identified from an Interest Rate Rule, 1996Q1-2007Q2a 
Asset Constant vf0 v,, v,2 v,3 v,4 R2 
Treasuries 
2 years to maturity 5.90 1.08*** 1.98*** 1.56*** 0.70* 0.89* 
(4.47) (0.37) (0.22) (0.33) (0.42) (0.50) 
5 years to maturity 3.46 0.61* 1.83*** 1 91*** 1 43*** 1.25** 
(4.31) (0.36) (0.21) (0.32) (0.40) (0.49) 
10 years to maturity 1.57 0.38 1.48*** 1.60*** 141*** 1 29*** 
(4.44) (0.37) (0.22) (0.33) (0.42) (0.50) 
Corporate bonds" 
Aaa/AAA-rated 0.60 0.19 0.65*** 0.75** 0.86** 0.17 
(4.63) (0.38) (0.23) (0.34) (0.43) (0.52) 
Baa/BBB-rated 0.57 0.13 0.69*** 0.71** 1 oo*** 0.37 
(4.01) (0.33) (0.20) (0.30) (0.38) (0.45) 
Source: Authors' regressions. 
a. Each row reports coefficients from a regression of changes in yields of the indicated asset from the 
last trading day of a quarter to that of the next on a constant and on shocks v,0 through v,4, where v,0 is the 
monetary policy shock that occurs contemporaneously with announcement t, and the remaining shocks 
v,j are forward guidance shocks indicating the change in monetary policy announced at t to occur in quar 
ter j. The regression coefficients can be interpreted as the response (in basis points) of the indicated asset 
price to a 1-basis-point change in the indicated vtJ. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate 
statistical significance at the *10 percent, **5 percent, and ***1 percent level. 
b. Both samples include only bonds with 20 or more years to maturity. 
coefficients, their standard errors, and the regressions' R2s. We express all 
of the variables in bp, so the coefficients can be read as the response in 
basis points to a 1-bp change in the right-hand-side variable. 
Although the coefficients' standard errors are not small, the regres 
sion estimates clearly show that the identified forward guidance shocks 
are associated with substantial changes in asset prices. A 100-bp increase 
in vu raises the 2- and 5-year Treasury yields by almost 200 bp and the 
10-year Treasury yield by about 150 bp. The effects on the two corporate 
bonds are more modest, 65 and 69 bp. In light of the standard errors, we 
judge the estimated effects of v,2 and v,3 on these bond yields to be about 
the same. The relatively small variance of v,4 translates into relatively large 
standard errors for its estimated effects on bond yields. Nevertheless, the 
point estimates for the effects of v,4 are statistically significant for the 5 
and 10-year Treasury yields. Overall, the estimated asset price effects 
of forward guidance inferred from the interest rate rule are much larger 
than the corresponding effects of forward guidance identified from the GSS 
event-study methodology. 
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Table 9. Regressions Estimating Forecast Revisions in Response to Forward Guidance 
Identified from an Interest Rate Rule, 1996Q1-2007Q2" 
Change inforecastb Constant v,0 vu V,2 V,3 vl4 R2 
Unemployment rate 
u;< - u? -6.82*** -0.37* -0.20 -0.13 -0.38 0.46 0.28 
(2.47) (0.20) (0.12) (0.18) (0.23) (0.28) 
" m ~ -4.02 -0.34 -0.30** -0.05 -0.27 0.54 0.27 
(2.92) (0.24) (0.14) (0.22) (0.27) (0.33) 
U'nl 
~ «?+2 -3.39 -0.46* —0.47*** -0.02 -0.20 0.30 0.34 
(2.93) (0.24) (0.14) (0.22) (0.27) (0.33) 
"is - "i-3 -2.86 -0.31 -0.47*** -0.00 -0.07 0.26 0.34 
(2.65) (0.22) (0.13) (0.20) (0.25) (0.30) 
Inflation 
K~' - K° 1.83 -0.35 0.23 -0.08 -0.61 -0.09 0.05 
(5.55) (0.46) (0.27) (0.41) (0.52) (0.63) 
<1 
~ 
<1 -5.20* -0.18 0.17 0.05 -0.44 0.07 0.10 
(2.91) (0.24) (0.14) (0.21) (0.27) (0.33) 
^'r+2 
— 
^/+2 -7.55*** -0.05 0.15 0.11 0.35 -0.02 0.10 
(2.69) (0.22) (0.13) (0.20) (0.25) (0.30) 
JtL 
- 
K, -5.32** -0.25 0.18* -0.07 0.09 -0.04 0.14 
(2.11) (0.18) (0.10) (0.16) (0.20) (0.24) 
Source: Authors' regressions. 
a. Each row reports coefficients from a regression of quarterly revisions to forecasts of the unemploy 
ment gap or CPI inflation on a constant and on shocks v,0 through v,4, where v,0 is the monetary policy 
shock that occurs contemporaneously with announcement t, and the remaining shocks vfJ are forward 
guidance shocks indicating the change in monetary policy announced at t to occur in quarter j. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the *10 percent, **5 percent, and 
***1 percent level. 
b. Each forecast revision is expressed as the forecast value for the period t +j outcome made at time 
t+j-n minus the same forecast value made at time t +j - n — 1, where t+j is the subscript and n and 
n + 1 are the superscripts. 
We find one aspect of the results in table 8 puzzling: the forward guid 
ance shocks have much larger estimated effects on bond yields than does 
the contemporaneous monetary policy shock, but the only substantial 
difference between v,j and v(0 is a y'-quarter implementation delay. If the 
Treasury rates correspond to the appropriate average of expected short 
term rates plus a term premium, and the forward guidance affects only the 
expected short-term rates, then the responses should be nearly identical. 
The fact that they are not strongly suggests that our identified forward guid 
ance shocks are affecting term premiums. Fully exploring this intriguing 
result lies beyond the scope of the present paper. 
Table 9 reports the results from regressing the eight forecast revisions 
against a constant and the five v's. With rational expectations, the constant 
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term should be irrelevant. It is indeed so for three of the four unemploy 
ment forecast revisions, but the Blue Chip forecasters consistently made a 
small (but statistically significant) 7-bp error in their final unemployment 
forecast. We see similar small but systematic errors in inflation expecta 
tions. The slope coefficients' standard errors are quite large (on the order 
of 20 to 30 bp), but nevertheless many of the coefficients on vu in the 
unemployment regressions are negative and statistically significant. That 
is, promises of more-restrictive policy in the next quarter are associated 
with reductions in unemployment expectations. Although the analogous 
coefficients from the inflation regressions are not statistically significant, it 
is also worth noting that they are positive. 
Of course, the New Keynesian model requires that reductions to cur 
rent and future interest rates be unanticipated if they are to lower expected 
unemployment and raise expected inflation, so the negative reaction of 
unemployment to vu clearly cannot be interpreted as the direct macroeco 
nomic effect of unanticipated forward guidance. However, neither can it 
be interpreted as reflecting simple reverse causality from publicly known 
macroeconomic circumstances to monetary policy, because the interest rate 
rule accounts for typical monetary policy choices given expectations of 
unemployment and inflation. One possibility worth considering is that the 
effects arise because the FOMC systematically responds to recent revisions 
in expectations. 
To understand this further, consider the following augmented interest 
rate rule: 
(4) r, = n + p,r,_, + p2r(_2 + (l 
- p, - p2)(<|>J, + <t>„K,) 
M 
+ T1 (u, -%)+ Zv,-w j=0 
Here r| < 0 measures the extent to which the FOMC reacts to unemployment 
news received over the last L quarters, specified here as u, - u\. One might 
suppose that r) will be large and negative if the FOMC becomes system 
atically worried about falling behind the curve following unemployment 
surprises. If L<M, then the newly added term in equation 4 is orthogonal 
to the instruments we used for estimation, so its presence will not affect our 
estimates of p„ p2, (J)^, and <(>„. However, it will change the inferred values 
of the interest rate rule's expected intercept, and through this will influ 
ence the estimated v's. Under this interpretation of the results in table 9, 
the FOMC's actions are history dependent. The estimated interest rate rule 
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states the typical policy stance given economic conditions forecasted 4 
quarters in advance, but the FOMC would respond more aggressively to 
the same set of circumstances if it forecasted them only shortly before their 
arrival.22 
II.F. Summary 
What does the analysis of forward guidance identified from a standard 
interest rate rule tell us? First, and perhaps most important for the poten 
tial viability of forward guidance-based strategies today, the public and 
the FOMC together have extensive experience with the communication of 
relatively short term forward guidance. Indeed, the FOMC used forward 
guidance to signal its acceleration of accommodation in late 2001 and early 
2002. Overall, the public anticipated about 40 percent of the variance in the 
interest rate rule's disturbance 3 or 4 quarters in advance. Second, unantici 
pated accommodative forward guidance reduces the interest rates relevant 
for households' and firms' economic decisions. That is, it seems possible 
for the FOMC to influence longer-term interest rates that are outside of 
its direct control by communicating its intention to lower the short-term 
policy rate persistently. 
III. Using Odyssean Forward Guidance 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the FOMC has experience success 
fully communicating its intended future behavior in response to prevailing 
macroeconomic conditions. We interpret this to mean that communication 
difficulties do not present an insurmountable barrier to monetary policies 
based on Odyssean forward guidance, and that therefore it is worth con 
sidering the practical consequences of adopting such policies. Currently, 
the FOMC has an extraordinary degree of forward guidance in place with 
its "late 2014" statement language. In this section we investigate the con 
sequences of interpreting that language as Odyssean forward guidance 
that implements the policy recommendations of Eggertsson and Woodford 
(2003) and others. There are legitimate concerns that forward guidance 
22. We cannot estimate coefficients like r) in equation 4 by regressing the measured 
values of v, on expectations revisions, because the true values of v, should be endogenously 
correlated with the expectations revision. Since the expectations revision is uncorrelated 
over time virtually by construction, neither can we employ an instrumental variables estima 
tor with lagged information as instruments. This leads us to believe that the cross-equation 
restrictions of structural models will be essential for identification and estimation of the real 
effects of forward guidance. 
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of this kind places the FOMC's mandated price stability goal at risk. We 
consider these by forecasting the path of the economy under the present 
forward guidance and subjecting that forecast to two upside risks: higher 
inflation expectations and faster deleveraging by households and firms. We 
undertake this analysis using the medium-scale DSGE model developed at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago for just such a purpose. 
Evans (2011) has proposed conditioning the FOMC's forward guidance 
on outcomes of unemployment and inflation expectations. Under his pro 
posal, the FOMC would announce specific conditions under which it will 
begin lifting its policy rate above zero: either unemployment falling below 
7 percent or medium-term expected annual inflation rising above 3 per 
cent would trigger liftoff from the ZLB. Bright-line threshold rules such 
as these are designed to maintain low interest rates even as the economy 
begins expanding on its own (as prescribed by Eggertsson and Woodford 
2003) while providing safeguards against unexpected developments that 
might put the FOMC's price stability goal in jeopardy. We illustrate that 
such conditioning, if credible, could be helpful in limiting the inflationary 
consequences of an unexpectedly early end to the postcrisis deleveraging. 
Our conclusions obviously depend on the assumed structure of the model 
economy and the values we assign its parameters. One might therefore 
doubt the usefulness of our model-based experiments, since there is little 
consensus on what the "right" structural model is, and even when there is 
agreement on the model, there is often disagreement over its parameter 
values. Nevertheless, we believe our experiments are both interesting and 
relevant to policy, for at least two reasons. First, the model is very similar 
to other widely used models and is essentially the standard structural tool 
for monetary policy analysis in the United States and around the world. 
Second, the model's parameters are estimated using a rich array of macro 
economic data so that our analysis has a firm empirical grounding. 
We begin by briefly describing the model, its estimation, and how we 
calibrate it to the current policy environment. Then we present our base 
line forecast and the consequences for monetary policy of two alternative 
scenarios. 
III.A. The Model 
The model is adapted from Justiniano and others (2011) and thus closely 
resembles many other medium-scale empirical New Keynesian models.23 A 
single representative household owns all firms and supplies the economy's 
23. The model is described in more detail in Brave and others (2012). 
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labor. Final goods are produced with differentiated intermediate goods, 
which themselves are produced with capital and differentiated labor. The 
intermediate goods market and the labor market are monopolistically com 
petitive. Prices of both kinds of differentiated inputs are sticky and are 
subject to partial indexation.24 Hence standard forward-looking Phillips 
curves connect wage and price inflation with the marginal rates of substi 
tution between consumption and leisure and marginal cost, respectively. 
Other frictions include endogenous capacity utilization, costs of adjusting 
investment growth, and internal habit preferences, where "internal habit" 
refers to diminishing current utility in lagged own consumption. The com 
bination of all these features is very close to that in models by Lawrence 
Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Frank Smets and Rafael 
Wouters (2007), and many others, so that knowledge of these models is 
sufficient for understanding the results. 
The model has one feature that distinguishes it from other New Keynes 
ian frameworks: the monetary policy interest rate rule.25 This rule is 
given by equation 1, except that we set p2 = 0 and replace u, with the 
policy-relevant output gap, y,.26 The policy-relevant measure of inflation 
in equation 1 is defined by 
(5) A, = j 2,E/rc,+,. -ft"„ 
where "A"denotes deviation from steady state. Equation 5 says that policy 
relevant inflation is the deviation of a 4-quarter average of inflation from 
the time-varying inflation anchor rc*. The model's inflation anchor varies 
exogenously and follows an AR(1) process. It is included to account for 
low-frequency movements in inflation and to consider policy experiments 
in which inflation expectations become "unanchored." The 4-quarter mov 
ing average of inflation includes both lagged, current, and future values of 
inflation. The monetary authority uses the structure of the model to forecast 
the future terms. 
24. In each period wages and prices have a constant probability of being optimally reset; 
otherwise they are exogenously indexed to a convex combination of steady-state inflation, 
last period's inflation, and (for wages) productivity growth. 
25. The model and estimation involve other unique features, but these do not change the 
model's shock propagation mechanisms, which continue to resemble those in other medium 
scale New Keynesian models. The model includes a financial accelerator as in Gilchrist, 
Ortiz, and Zakrajsek (2011), but this ends up being unimportant for the results. 
26. In future work we intend to consider the case where p2 * 0. 
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We define the output gap as 
(6) *'+j' 
(7) E, {[l + 7,(1 
- L)2{ 1 - F)2]x,} = E, [\(l 
- Lf (1 - F)2 yt] 
where L and F denote lags and leads, respectively, and X is a smoothing 
parameter. Equation 6 defines the output gap as a 4-quarter moving aver 
age of detrended model output. Following Vasco Curdia and others (2011), 
the monetary authority detrends output using the filter given by equation 7. 
(We consider only stationary solutions.) This detrending approximates 
Hodrick-Prescott filtering. The moving average of filtered output has the 
same lead-lag structure as inflation and so also includes forward-looking 
terms, which embody news about inflation and the output gap up to 2 quar 
ters ahead. 
We use the GSS factor structure for the forward guidance shocks 
in equation 1. In particular, we allow there to be a target factor and a 
path factor driving forward guidance, both of which are independent 
and identically distributed over time. All current and forward guidance 
shocks load onto the target factor, and all but the contemporaneous pol 
icy shock load onto the path factor. Corresponding to each current and 
forward guidance shock there is also an additive idiosyncratic shock. For 
the precrisis sample we set M = 4 in equation 1 and estimate the factor 
loadings, the two factor variances, and variances for the idiosyncratic 
shocks at each horizon of forward guidance. Agents in the model there 
fore see a credible commitment to deviate from the typical response of 
policy to current economic conditions going out 4 quarters. Within the 
context of the model, the forward guidance shocks are entirely Odyssean 
because they are a (credible) commitment to a future action. 
We identify the contemporaneous, forward guidance, and inflation 
anchor shocks using data on the federal funds rate, federal funds rate futures 
prices, and long-run (10-year) inflation expectations taken from the Survey 
of Professional Forecasters. The current policy shock moves the current 
rate more than it does future rates, whereas the forward guidance and the 
inflation anchor shocks move expected future federal funds rates more than 
they do the current rate. This difference is a key source of identification. 
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Both the inflation anchor and the forward guidance shocks influence infla 
tion, with the effects of the latter arising through the Phillips curve. We 
assume that the inflation anchor is very persistent, so that the effects of 
forward guidance shocks on inflation expectations are comparatively more 
concentrated at shorter horizons. As a result, the forward guidance shocks 
are identified from changes in future rates that are larger than changes in 
the current rate and are associated with only small movements in long-run 
inflation expectations. We do not use the Blue Chip data to identify forward 
guidance in the model because we want to consider horizons of forward 
guidance beyond 1 year during the period in which the ZLB is binding. 
A natural objection to using forward guidance as a tool for generating 
additional monetary accommodation is that, by doing so, the monetary 
authority risks inflation expectations becoming unhinged. In our sample, 
inflation expectations exhibit a downward trend, so we strongly suspect 
that episodes of forward guidance raising long-run inflation expectations 
are absent from our precrisis sample. That said, one needs to be wary of 
this possibility in the current environment. 
In addition to the monetary policy shocks, the model's fluctuations 
are driven by eight "structural" shocks. With one exception noted below, 
these shocks are assumed to follow an AR(1) process. Four of these shocks 
move real GDP and inflation (as measured by the GDP deflator) in the 
same direction on impact, so we refer to these as demand shocks. One, the 
discount shock, changes households' rate of time discounting. Another two 
are financial disturbances: the spread shock generates fluctuations in the 
external finance premium beyond the level warranted by current economic 
conditions, and the net worth shock generates exogenous fluctuations in 
private balance sheets.27 The fourth demand shock, called the government 
shock, is a shock to the sum of government spending, net exports, and 
the change in valuation of inventories. Four other shocks move real GDP 
and inflation in opposite directions on impact, and so we call these sup 
ply shocks. These shocks directly change neutral technology, investment 
specific technology, markups of intermediate goods prices, and households' 
disutility from labor. The last of these is assumed to follow an ARMA(1,1) 
process, to parsimoniously address low-frequency dynamics in hours 
worked and high-frequency variation in hourly wages. Other shocks that 
27. These shocks enter because of the financial accelerator mentioned earlier. The net 
worth shock plays a negligible role in fluctuations, but the spread shock is a major driver 
of fluctuations. The model propagates the spread shock essentially as it does a shock to the 
marginal efficiency of investment identified using spread data. 
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are of small importance in accounting for the data are shocks that do not 
affect agents' decisions: idiosyncratic shocks to the various price measures 
used in estimation, and measurement error in the two financial variables 
described below.28 
III.B. Estimation 
We use a two-step procedure to assign values to our DSGE model's 
parameters. First, we estimate the model over the period from 1989Q2 
(when federal funds futures contract data begin) to 2007Q2 (just before 
the onset of the financial crisis) under the assumption that forward guid 
ance extends out 4 quarters. Second, for the period 2007Q3-2011Q4 we fix 
the non-forward guidance parameters at their estimated values (with four 
exceptions highlighted below) and reestimate forward guidance under the 
assumption that it extends out 10 quarters. Our policy experiments are based 
on this new set of monetary policy parameters, but the model's determina 
tion of the state of the economy takes into account the data from before 
2007Q4 as well as the parameter values that were in force at that time. 
Our estimates for the period 1989Q2-2007Q2 imply that most fluctua 
tions are driven by the demand shocks.29 The data used to estimate the 
model include growth rates of nominal GDP per capita, consumption, and 
investment; hours per capita worked in the nonfarm business sector; nomi 
nal compensation per hour worked in nonfarm business; the GDP defla 
tor; the deflators corresponding to model-based measures of consumption 
and investment; the core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) defla 
tor; core CPI; 10-year-ahead forecasts of CPI; an interest rate spread; the 
ratio of private credit to GDP; the federal funds rate; and contemporaneous 
expectations of the federal funds rate 1 to 4 quarters hence. Consumption 
is measured as consumption of nondurable goods and services, and invest 
ment includes business fixed investment, residential investment, and PCE 
on durable goods.30 The interest rate spread is a weighted average of high 
28. Model-consistent measures of consumption prices do not correspond well with either 
of the measures commonly referenced by policymakers and market participants, core PCE 
and core CPI. We use a factor structure to model three consumption price series: the two 
popular core measures and the measure designed to be consistent with the model. Doing 
this delivers predictions for core PCE and core CPI and limits the structural impact of high 
frequency fluctuations in inflation that are likely driven by measurement error. Model-based 
inflation is identified with the common factor. 
29. Technical details of the estimation are discussed in Brave and others (2012). 
30. The remaining components of aggregate expenditures—government spending, net 
exports, and private inventory accumulation—are modeled as the government shock. 
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yield corporate and mortgage-backed bond spreads over 10-year Treasuries 
and an asset-backed bond spread over 5-year Treasuries, where the weights 
equal the shares of nonfinancial business, household mortgage, and house 
hold consumer debt in a measure of total private credit that includes both 
households' and nonfinancial businesses' debts. 
Brave and others (2012) report the parameter estimates in more detail. 
Here we highlight two sets of parameters that have important implica 
tions for the outcomes of the policy experiments. First, the monetary 
policy rule displays a high degree of interest rate smoothing, the inflation 
gap coefficient obeys the Taylor principle, and the output gap coefficient 
is smaller than the coefficient for inflation. Reflecting the downward 
trend in inflation over our sample, the inflation anchor is very persistent. 
The plausibility of the policy rule depends in part on the nature of the 
output gap in the rule. Brave and others (2012) demonstrate that the model's 
output gap corresponds well to the gap published by the Congressional 
Budget Office. 
Second, the estimated model has large nominal and real rigidities. Partly 
because of the sample over which it is estimated, the slope of the price 
Phillips curve is very small, about an order of magnitude smaller than 
single-equation estimates (for example, those of Gall and Gertler 1999 and 
Eichenbaum and Fisher 2007). The wage Phillips curve slope is also small 
but more in line with estimates that do not rely on the full structure of the 
model, such as those by Argia Sbordone (2006). Our estimates imply that 
there is limited feedback from aggregate activity to wage or price inflation 
in the model. The estimated real rigidities as implied by the elasticity of 
capacity utilization, investment adjustment costs, and habit are similar in 
magnitude to other estimates in the literature (for example, Justiniano and 
others 2011) and impart considerable inertia in response to shocks. 
111.C. Policy Experiments 
The macroeconomic outcomes from 2007Q3 to 2011Q4 are unusual 
compared with those of the period used to estimate the model. Therefore, to 
conduct policy experiments relevant to the current economic environment, 
we calibrate some of the model's parameters and reestimate the effects of 
forward guidance. This reestimation is particularly important because of 
the relatively long horizon over which forward guidance has been issued 
by the FOMC during the recent period. 
We calibrate three parameters for the period 2007Q3-2011Q4: the per 
sistence of the discount shock, the variance of the inflation anchor shock, 
and the coefficient on the output gap in the policy rule. To capture the idea 
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that deleveraging by households and firms following the financial crisis 
is unusually slow, we raise the persistence of the discount shock from its 
estimated value in the precrisis sample.31 Consequently, the model sees dis 
count shocks playing a larger role since 2007Q2 than at other times, lead 
ing to much lower aggregate demand at the end of the sample. Essentially 
the model interprets much of the weakness in the data as reflecting agents' 
desires to save much more than they have at other times under similar con 
ditions. We set the variance of the inflation anchor innovation to one-fourth 
its estimated value from the precrisis period. This choice is motivated by 
the fact that inflation expectations exhibit a downward trend in the first part 
of our sample but have fluctuated considerably less since then. Finally, we 
assume a coefficient on the output gap in the model's policy rule that is 
three times the size of the precrisis estimate. Our motivation here is that the 
FOMC's policy response to a very large recession may be more aggressive 
than to a modest one. Together these assumptions increase the likelihood 
that the ZLB is binding in any given quarter since 2007Q3. 
Given the calibrated parameters and precrisis estimates for the remain 
ing parameters excluding forward guidance and the discount shock's 
variance, we reestimate the factor loadings, factor variances, and idiosyn 
cratic variances that characterize forward guidance as well as the discount 
shocks' variance over the period 2007Q3-2011Q4 under the assumption 
that forward guidance extends out 10 quarters.32 Our estimation of for 
ward guidance in this period uses expected future federal funds rates going 
out 10 quarters from each date in the sample. With estimates in hand and 
data for this period, the Kalman smoother is used to back out the model's 
interpretation of the shocks hitting the economy since the crisis and their 
implications for the model's state variables as of 2011Q4. One important 
implication of our calibration and estimated forward guidance is that the 
model sees the ZLB as binding from 2008Q4 until the end of our sample 
in 2011Q4.33 At this last date the model can be used to generate a forecast 
under the assumption that no further shocks hit the economy. This is our 
baseline forecast. 
31. The discount factor is commonly used to model episodes in which the ZLB is bind 
ing. See, for example, Christiano and others (2011). 
32. We reestimate the discount shock's variance to ameliorate concerns that we have 
imposed excessive weight on this shock in explaining the crisis. 
33. We say the ZLB is binding at any given date if, when all but the forward guidance 
factor shocks have been fed into the model to generate a conditional forecast beginning in 
2008Q3, the forecasted path of the federal funds rate at each date would be below zero for at 
least one period at short horizons. 
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Figure 5. Baseline and Alternative Projections 
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Source: Authors' calculations. 
Figure 5 displays the baseline forecast along with forecasts corresponding 
to two alternative scenarios described below. The horizontal line in each plot 
indicates the long-run average of the variable in question over the sample 
1989Q2-2007Q2 (the logarithm of hours per capita has a mean that is very close 
to zero). The forward guidance in the baseline forecasts has been estimated 
to fit the federal funds rate futures path through mid-2014, after which the 
model predicts a mild liftoff in the funds rate to about 1 percent at the end of 
2014. This path is roughly in line with the "late 2014" forward guidance in 
the January and March 2012 FOMC statements. Corresponding to this path 
for the funds rate, the baseline forecast calls for growth slightly above trend 
for 2012, returning to trend in 2013 and 2014. Growth is sufficiently tepid 
that the log of hours per capita is still 10 log points below its steady-state 
level by the end of the forecast horizon. Core PCE inflation, after initially 
dropping, is forecasted to rise slowly toward its long-run average. 
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Figure 6. Inflation and Unemployment in the Baseline Forecast 
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Source: Projections of the authors' model described in the text. 
Figure 6 shows the baseline forecast in inflation-unemployment space.34 
The horizontal bar represents the FOMC's policy objective of 2 percent 
annual inflation, as described in the FOMC document "Longer-Run Goals 
and Policy Strategy," and the "central tendency" of longer-run unemploy 
ment of 5.2 to 6.0 percent reported in the January 2012 release of FOMC 
participants' economic projections. The 2011Q4 launch date for the fore 
cast is labeled, with the economy's path proceeding from there. The smaller 
dots along the path indicate the period of a near-zero federal funds rate, 
and the two dots at the far end of the path indicate forecast dates where the 
34. Our model does not have unemployment in it. However, an ordinary least squares 
regression of unemployment on hours per capita fits extremely well. We use this regression 
model to map our forecast for hours per capita into a forecast for unemployment. 
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federal funds rate has risen above the ZLB. The bright-line thresholds of 
7 percent unemployment and 3 percent inflation are also shown. 
In this baseline forecast, core inflation has moved closer to the FOMC's 
explicit objective by the end of 2014. However, unemployment at that date 
seems high relative to any rate that would be consistent with the FOMC's 
mandated goal of maximum sustainable employment. Lengthening the 
period that the federal funds rate is kept at zero would bring policy closer to 
the optimum identified by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Werning 
(2012). The FOMC may be disinclined to push the limit of monetary policy 
accommodation very far in this dimension, however. Although calendar 
date communications may have an Odyssean component, most market 
analysis seems to interpret the dates as Delphic communications, possibly 
limiting their stimulating effect. Finding acceptable bright-line thresholds 
might impart a larger commitment to accommodation. Since the forecast 
does not breach either the unemployment or the inflation threshold in this 
baseline scenario, the threshold rule would prescribe keeping the funds rate 
low for a longer period. 
It is worth emphasizing that beyond providing additional Odyssean for 
ward guidance, such a threshold rule offers a risk management approach to 
guarding against unforeseen circumstances. To illustrate this point, we con 
sider two experiments that simulate the effects of developments that give 
rise to greater inflation concerns. In each case we calculate the model's 
forecast from 2011Q4 onward under the assumption that an unanticipated 
event occurs in 2012Q1. The state of the economy in 2011Q4 includes all 
prior realizations of forward guidance, and agents in the model foresee 
exceptionally low interest rates through to late 2014. Our scenarios evalu 
ate the consequences of maintaining this policy regardless of developments 
that could lead the FOMC to start raising the federal funds rate earlier. We 
do not impose the threshold policy in either scenario. Rather, we simply 
monitor the boundaries to examine whether such conditional forward guid 
ance would call for a liftoff from the ZLB sooner than currently anticipated. 
For each scenario we assume either a permanent change in a single 
model parameter or the realization of a shock for one period. In the scenario 
with a parameter change, we resolve the model and use this solution for 
the associated forecast. In both scenarios we compute the forecast starting 
from the same estimated state of the economy used to construct the base 
line forecast. In the scenario with a sudden increase in long-run inflation 
expectations, the unanticipated event is an unusually large and persistent 
innovation to the inflation anchor. We assume a single innovation to the 
inflation anchor that generates an immediate increase in long-run inflation 
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expectations of 1 percentage point.35 In the rapid deleveraging scenario, 
we assume that the persistence of the discount rate shock drops from its 
calibrated level of 0.95 to its precrisis level of 0.75 but do not consider any 
additional shocks. In this scenario, past realizations of the discount shock 
die out much sooner than anticipated in the baseline forecast (the half-life 
of a discount shock declines from 3.4 years to 2.4 quarters.) 
Each scenario involves solving for the forward guidance that reproduces 
the expected funds path through 2014Q2. This is accomplished by setting 
one of the idiosyncratic shocks to zero and then solving for the realiza 
tion of the target and path factors in the first period, plus the other nine 
idiosyncratic shocks such that the funds path is matched exactly through 
2014Q2. (We apply the estimated factor loadings underlying the baseline 
forecast to calculate the forward guidance shocks.) As figure 5 illustrates, 
both alternative scenarios generate fast growth immediately: faster dele 
veraging occurs through a less contractionary discount factor, and higher 
expected inflation through lower real interest rates. Therefore, maintaining 
the funds rate path requires very large expansionary realizations of the path 
factor—essentially large expansionary forward guidance. With this large 
amount of monetary accommodation in place, annual inflation rises above 
2 percent in both scenarios, although hours per capita remain relatively 
low. Presumably less expansionary monetary policy, involving an earlier 
liftoff of the funds rate from zero, would be required to forestall this higher 
inflation, but this would be at the expense of an even weaker labor market. 
Figures 7 and 8 show the two alternative scenarios in inflation 
unemployment space. These figures are similar to figure 6 except that they 
also include the baseline forecast for comparison. Under faster delever 
aging, unemployment falls faster and inflation rises by more than in the 
baseline. The economy crosses the 7 percent unemployment threshold in 
2012Q3 and reaches the 3 percent inflation threshold in late 2013. There 
fore, adherence to the 7/3 threshold policy dictates liftoff from the ZLB in 
late 2012. Given the improvement in the economy and labor markets, an 
earlier exit seems palatable. 
We now consider the higher-expected-inflation scenario. Note that gen 
erating the increase in inflation expectations in this scenario requires a 
shock that is more than 4 standard deviations of the inflation anchor inno 
vation as estimated in the precrisis sample. The resulting forecast, condi 
35. Given the high persistence of the inflation anchor, the increase in average expected 
inflation over the next 40 quarters is actually hump shaped, and therefore higher in later 
quarters. 
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Figure 7. Inflation and Unemployment in the Forecast with Shorter Deleveraging 
Core PCE inflation (percent per year) 
Source: Projections of the authors' model described in the text. 
tioning on exceptionally low rates through at least the next 10 quarters, 
does generate a boom in GDP growth. However, because of the strong real 
and nominal rigidities we have estimated, neither unemployment nor infla 
tion crosses its threshold within the next 3 years. The unemployment rate 
skirts its 7 percent threshold without crossing it, and inflation remains well 
below its 3 percent threshold, through the end of 2014. Although the 7/3 
threshold policy would dictate keeping rates at the ZLB in this scenario, 
the turn in the direction of unemployment toward the end of the forecast 
horizon is worrisome. 
This scenario illustrates a striking feature of New Keynesian models 
estimated using post-1970s data. Because of the very flat price Phillips 
curve, very large innovations to inflation expectations do not lead to high 
inflation even with extraordinarily accommodative monetary policy, at 
least over a 3-year horizon. This result depends on the assumed credibility 
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Figure 8. Inflation and Unemployment in the Forecast with Higher Expected Inflation 
Core PCE inflation (percent per year) 
Source: Projections of the authors' model described in the text. 
of the model's policy rule and invariance of price setting behavior to infla 
tion expectations. If attempted use of Odyssean forward guidance weakens 
credibility or changes price setting behavior, this kind of policy experiment 
might be very misleading. Nevertheless, nothing in the experience of the 
last 25 years suggests that a persistent change in inflation expectations nec 
essarily generates a destabilizing loss of credibility. 
IV. Conclusion 
The empirical context we have provided shows that the FOMC has exten 
sive experience at broadcasting its intended responses to macroeconomic 
developments. Indeed, macroeconomic forecasters and market partici 
pants anticipate about 80 percent of the FOMC's deviations from a simple 
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interest rate rule. These communications have not been limited to a single 
"tight- versus-loose" dimension. The FOMC successfully informed markets 
that it would accelerate its accommodation in late 2001 and early 2002 and 
accelerate its removal. Our results also show that surprises associated with 
FOMC policy announcements substantially influence Treasury bond rates, 
corporate borrowing rates, and private macroeconomic forecasts. News 
of substantial monetary tightening raises interest rates as expected, but it 
also raises inflation forecasts and lowers unemployment forecasts. This 
counterintuitive finding suggests to us that private forecasters believe that 
nonpublic information held by the Federal Reserve about future economic 
conditions instigates some FOMC actions that were unanticipated by the 
public. That is, the public sometimes imputes Delphic content to policy 
announcements that are not explicitly tied to economic fundamentals. 
As expressed in its April 2012 statement, the most recent as of this writ 
ing, the FOMC . . anticipates that economic conditions—including low 
rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the 
medium run—are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the fed 
eral funds rate at least through late 2014." We began this paper by asking 
whether this statement reflects an Odyssean commitment to lower rates or 
a Delphic forecast of economic conditions and the FOMC's likely response 
to them. Our empirical results reassure us that communications difficulties 
present no insurmountable obstacle to the FOMC stressing the Odyssean 
interpretation and thereby providing additional monetary accommodation, 
but other objections to such a policy remain. In particular, one might worry 
that an Odyssean commitment to low rates places the FOMC's price stabil 
ity mandate in jeopardy. 
We have addressed this concern by using the Chicago Federal Reserve 
Bank's estimated DSGE model to simulate two adverse scenarios. In the 
first, the deleveraging process presently keeping the economy at the ZLB 
accelerates and finishes sooner than expected, and in the second, long-run 
inflation expectations suddenly rise 1 full percentage point. We compare 
both simulations with the "bright-line" threshold policy proposal of Evans 
(2011), which calls for rate increases to begin when either unemployment 
falls below 7 percent or medium-term expected annual inflation rises above 
3 percent. With faster deleveraging beginning in 2012Q1, the unemploy 
ment rate falls below its threshold for triggering rate increases in 2012Q3. 
In this case the policy provides useful insurance against the inflationary 
consequences of an unforeseen economic recovery. With an exogenous rise 
in inflation expectations occurring in 2012Q1, the economy comes close 
to (but does not cross) the unemployment threshold at the start of 2014 
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and comes nowhere near the inflation threshold. We conclude from these 
experiments that the risks of Odyssean forward guidance to the Federal 
Reserve's price stability mandate can be managed with such conditional 
forward guidance. 
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COMMENT BY 
CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS This impressive paper by Jeffrey Campbell, 
Charles Evans, Jonas Fisher, and Alejandro Justiniano contains many 
useful facts about monetary policy, and its existence itself is an interesting 
fact, because one of its authors is an important monetary policymaker seek 
ing to influence Federal Reserve actions and the market's perceptions of 
them. Charles Evans is among the most aggressive advocates of monetary 
expansion within the central bank, and he has elsewhere proposed a novel 
approach to expansion, called the "7/3" approach. Under that proposal the 
Federal Reserve would not only expand the money supply but promise to 
continue expanding it so long as the unemployment rate is above 7 per 
cent, unless the annual inflation rate rises above 3 percent. To build his 
case for such a new policy commitment, Evans has written this paper with 
three other economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, arguing, 
first, that the Federal Reserve has already been making similar sorts of 
policy commitments, and second, that these commitments have been very 
effective policy tools. 
The central factual claim in the paper is that forward guidance by the 
Federal Reserve has not merely provided information to the markets, in 
what the authors term "Delphic" forward guidance; they argue that some of 
the observed market consequences of forward guidance can only be under 
stood as evidence of a perceived commitment by the Federal Reserve to 
the markets, which the authors label "Odyssean" forward guidance. In their 
view this evidence of market reactions to Federal Reserve commitments 
shows how powerful such commitments can be, and therefore buttresses 
the case for more of the same today (the 7/3 proposal). 
As every student of Homer's classics is aware, however, there is more 
than one possible meaning for the term "Odyssean policy." In Homer's 
55 
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Odyssey, Odysseus did indeed use a commitment device to prevent himself 
from falling prey to the song of the Sirens (the meaning the authors intend 
in referring to "Odyssean" forward guidance), but in the Iliad he also was 
the architect and perpetrator of the most effective deception in the history 
of warfare. Just as the Trojan Horse helped the Greeks convince the Trojans 
to abandon their defenses, so might an advocate of new monetary commit 
ments lower the guard of markets and other policymakers by persuading 
them that the Federal Reserve has made such commitments successfully 
in the past. Which of these two "Odyssean" policies does this paper do 
more to illuminate, the power of past Federal Reserve commitments, or the 
wishful thinking of a policymaker flogging the monetary equivalent of a 
Trojan Horse? 
As a close follower of the Federal Reserve and its policy pronounce 
ments, I reacted with something of a shock to the claim that it has been using 
forward guidance to make successful commitments to markets in recent 
years. A commitment is defined as a credible promise to do something. The 
authors use the same words to define commitment in the first page of their 
paper. For example, we can agree that Evans's 7/3 policy proposal would 
be a real commitment, since it would enunciate a clear contingent policy for 
the future, based on observable phenomena (inflation and unemployment), 
which would thereby allow the Federal Reserve to be held accountable, 
through loss of reputation in the markets, for violating that commitment. In 
macroeconomic theory, the usefulness of a commitment is to overcome the 
problem of time inconsistency by binding oneself today to a policy action 
in the future that is long-run optimal from today's perspective but that will 
not be optimal to choose in the future. 
By this definition, nothing the Federal Reserve has done through its for 
ward guidance can reasonably be construed as a commitment. Certainly, 
the plain language of its forward guidance statements does not constitute 
promises. For example, in its most recent statements the Federal Reserve 
"anticipates," but does not promise, that interest rates will remain 
unchanged through 2014. It explicitly reserves the right to change its poli 
cies as economic circumstances change. Furthermore, policymakers at 
the Federal Reserve often draw attention to the fact that forward guidance 
is not a commitment. For example, Charles Plosser (president of the Phila 
delphia Federal Reserve Bank and an opponent of monetary expansion 
recently) has emphasized that forward guidance today is a forecast, not a 
promise, and that the Federal Reserve has explicitly reserved the right to 
change course if the data on which its forecast is based change (Plosser 
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2012). During his recent confirmation hearings, Federal Reserve Board 
nominee Jeremy Stein agreed with that assessment. Forward guidance 
before the recent crisis was even less specific and contained no language 
that could reasonably be construed as a promise. 
Is it possible that the Federal Reserve is making implicit commitments 
through forward guidance, even though its own language and many of its 
policymakers say otherwise? That does not seem possible. A commitment 
requires clarity about what is being promised; otherwise it is hard to see 
how there could be any accountability for violating it. Members of the Fed 
eral Open Market Committee (FOMC), both individually and as a group, 
have used forward guidance to express their beliefs based on current evi 
dence but have never made a commitment. If members were to change 
their forecasts of economic activity in, say, mid-2013 in response to new 
information, and then decide to start raising interest rates in late 2013 in 
light of their new beliefs, that would be entirely consistent with their past 
forward guidance statements, and it would be hard to see why the Federal 
Reserve as an institution or the FOMC members as individuals would suf 
fer any loss of reputation as a result. Forward guidance simply entails no 
commitment, as defined either by macroeconomic theory or by common 
English usage. 
The authors understand English as well as I do, so why do they insist 
that the Federal Reserve has been making important commitments through 
forward guidance? Their argument that forward guidance has been used 
as a commitment is purely empirical. The authors claim to have unearthed 
facts that prove that forward guidance has been functioning as a commit 
ment device. First, they show that a study of the effects of Federal Reserve 
statements provides convincing evidence that forward guidance moves 
federal funds futures prices at the time the guidance is provided to the 
market. Furthermore, they argue, these changes in futures prices are use 
ful for predicting federal funds rates in the future because they predict 
Federal Reserve actions, not because they contain information about the 
short-term state of the economy. If the movements in federal funds futures 
prices at the time of guidance announcements were correlated only with 
information about the economy that the Federal Reserve possessed but that 
markets had not yet understood, then the authors would regard that guid 
ance as "Delphic" but not "Odyssean." Those guidance announcements 
must be regarded as Odyssean, they argue, because they are not only useful 
for revealing unknown facts about the economy; they predict future policy 
actions, conditional on the state of the economy. 
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Is this argument correct? No. It ignores two very plausible alterna 
tive possibilities: first, that forward guidance provides information to the 
market about the Federal Reserve's objectives, and second, that forward 
guidance provides information to the market about the Federal Reserve's 
beliefs about the long-run natural rate of unemployment (an unobservable 
variable that underlies the future "deviations" from the Taylor rule that the 
authors identify). 
The Federal Reserve's objectives are only vaguely specified or con 
strained by statute. Its well-known legislative triple mandate (with respect 
to inflation, employment, and interest rates) does not specify trade-offs 
among those three objectives. The Federal Reserve recently announced a 
desire to target inflation at about 2 percent per year over some unspecified 
long run. It is well known that the Federal Reserve thinks about policy in 
the context of Taylor rules, at least in part, but also that it employs more 
than one version of the Taylor rule when thinking about its policy options, 
and that it has made no explicit commitment to using any particular ver 
sion of the Taylor rule. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve has frequently 
noted that its policy actions reflect policy considerations other than those 
embodied in the Taylor rule. This was especially true during 2002-05, 
when the Federal Reserve loosened policy dramatically and deviated con 
sciously from the Taylor rule when doing so. FOMC members discussed 
special considerations, including oil prices, geopolitical circumstances, 
and other perceived downside risks, which, they argued, required special 
actions not contemplated by adherence to the Taylor rule. Thus, Federal 
Reserve policy cannot be said always to follow a Taylor rule, much less a 
single, known Taylor rule. Policymakers may at times abandon the Taylor 
rule, and even to the extent that they adhere to it, one thing that is not 
known, and which is subject to change, is the relative cost the FOMC 
members attach to deviations from targeted inflation relative to permit 
ting unemployment to rise above its long-run non-accelerating-inflation 
(or "natural") rate. 
This uncertainty about objectives also reflects the fact that the Federal 
Reserve is a highly politicized entity. It is subject to substantial political 
risk because the federal government can change its charter at any time. 
Indeed, changes in the structure and powers of the Federal Reserve and the 
mandates under which it operates are frequently proposed. In my experi 
ence, FOMC members are quite aware of these risks and very responsive to 
them, although they never acknowledge this publicly. Thus, both because 
of changes in the ideological makeup of the FOMC and because of politi 
cal pressures that its members may feel, the cost weights that the members 
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attach to short-term increases in unemployment and inflation are neither 
known nor immutable. Those weights likely change over time as the result 
of changes in the membership of the FOMC or in the political pressures 
that influence their actions. For example, it is often noted in the press 
that the current Federal Reserve is unusually responsive to the political 
consequences of high unemployment. One obvious interpretation of market 
reactions to forward guidance—and one that the authors do not consider— 
is that such guidance reveals something about these changing objectives 
of the FOMC. 
The second obvious alternative explanation for the authors' finding 
is that forward guidance reveals something about the FOMC's beliefs about 
the natural rate of unemployment. Even if policymakers employed a rigid 
Taylor rule, and even if their policy preferences with respect to the costs of 
deviations of inflation and unemployment from their long-term levels were 
known, forward guidance could still reveal something to the market about 
FOMC members' beliefs about the natural rate of unemployment (which 
is contained within the Taylor rule as an assumption). The natural rate is 
not a constant, and indeed it can be subject to dramatic and unobservable 
medium-term change. The authors' model assumes that the natural rate is 
known to everyone, and for purposes of their analysis they set it equal to a 
consensus view based on published forecasts. But in practice no one knows 
what the natural rate is, and everyone wants to know what the members 
of the FOMC think that it is. 
Uncertainty about the natural rate is especially high in the wake 
of a severe recession. Studies of labor markets show that the ability of 
unemployed workers to find employment declines with the amount of 
time they are out of work. During a recession as deep as the recent one, 
many people are without work for longer periods than under normal eco 
nomic circumstances (Davis and von Wachter 2011): today a substantial 
proportion of the unemployed have been unemployed for 2 years or more. 
Long-term unemployment can reflect secular declines in some industries, 
and thus the need for sectoral reallocation of workers and retraining before 
workers are likely to find new jobs. Furthermore, unemployment itself 
reduces the skill set of workers within their industry, making it hard for 
the long-term unemployed to find employment even if their sector has not 
suffered long-term decline. When the economy has just weathered a severe, 
long-lived recession, one cannot say with any reasonable certainty what 
the natural rate of unemployment is. It may be 5 percent or it may be 
7 percent. Because the natural rate is not a matter of knowledge, much 
less a matter of common knowledge, uncertainty can arise among market 
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participants over what FOMC members believe it to be. Forward guidance, 
therefore, provides information to the market about the Federal Reserve's 
beliefs about the natural rate, and the markets' reactions to forward guid 
ance, as measured by the authors, could be interpreted as reflecting, at least 
in part, changes in those market inferences about the Federal Reserve's 
beliefs about the natural rate. 
For these reasons it is not correct to argue that the evidence presented in 
the paper regarding federal funds futures markets shows that forward guid 
ance has been Odyssean rather than Delphic. Given the strong prima facie 
arguments against viewing forward guidance as a form of commitment, it 
is far more likely that FOMC statements have affected market perceptions 
of the Federal Reserve's changing objectives and beliefs. 
All of this does not mean that the authors are wrong to advocate for a 
"bright-line" rule like Evans's proposed 7/3 commitment. It simply means 
that any argument for such a rule must be guided mainly by theory rather 
than experience. There is certainly a respectable case to be made (building, 
for example, on the logic of Eggertsson and Woodford 2003) that some ver 
sion of a 7/3 rule could credibly place the Federal Reserve's reputational 
capital at risk, and thereby constitute a credible commitment to maintain 
expansion into the future, which could add to the stimulative effect of mon 
etary loosening. I also agree with the authors that such a two-sided com 
mitment could potentially mitigate inflation risk by binding the Federal 
Reserve to react to accelerating inflation in the future through an explicit 
commitment not to tolerate rising inflation. 
Still, I do not support further action by the Federal Reserve to loosen at 
this time, even if accompanied by a bright-line 7/3 rule. I see little poten 
tial short-term gain to the economy from further reducing long-term inter 
est rates (which are already at historic lows) by a few basis points. A few 
more basis points reduction in long-term bond rates will not do much to 
address the deep problems (including fiscal policy uncertainties) that are 
constraining current economic growth. Nor do I believe that the authors' 
modified DSGE model's estimates, based on past observations, are very 
relevant for gauging the extent of inflation risk going forward. The risks 
faced by the Federal Reserve in the future reflect particular circumstances 
related to its balance sheet structure and to the political constraints under 
which it operates. These factors imply extraordinary circumstances and 
unique new sources of inflation risk. When these are taken into account, 
the risk-reward ratio for further expansionary monetary policy is very 
poor. The time has come for the Federal Reserve to end its quantitative 
easing policies, and to begin to phase in a gradual, preannounced increase 
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in reserve requirements. Such an increase, if designed properly, would 
have no discernible immediate effect on economic activity but would be a 
crucial safeguard against future inflation, and it would produce an orderly 
transition to the inevitable tightening of monetary policy sometime in 
the future. Excess reserves are very large at the moment. An increase in 
required reserves would have virtually no effect on the current supply 
of money or the current supply of lending (for a historical parallel see 
Calomiris, Mason, and Wheelock 2011). The most likely immediate 
response by banks, if any, would be to reduce their Treasury holdings, 
shifting them into cash. 
In my view there are two independent reasons to move to higher long-run 
reserve requirements. First, much higher (and remunerated) reserve require 
ments are desirable as a long-term prudential tool to complement capital 
requirements (Calomiris, Heider, and Hoerova 2011, Calomiris 2012). Cash 
reserve requirements are observable and hence credible protections for 
insured deposits, unlike capital requirements, which are accounting arti 
facts prone to manipulation by bankers and supervisors. Furthermore, cash 
holdings have important incentive consequences for effective bank risk 
management, because higher cash-to-asset ratios limit the losses borne by 
deposits for any given loss in risky assets. Book capital ratio requirements 
in the banking system are a recent prudential tool (in the United States, 
they began to be used only in 1981) and lack a track record of much suc 
cess. Cash ratio requirements have a much longer and more effective his 
tory. It is high time to restore substantial cash ratio requirements as part of 
the prudential regulatory toolkit. 
Second, the high level of excess reserves in the banking system, com 
bined with the structure of the Federal Reserve's asset portfolio, presents 
a substantial risk of future inflation if banks at some point choose to 
convert those excess reserves into loans. Some monetary policymakers 
see the Federal Reserve's commitment to low inflation as already suf 
ficiently credible, and others (including Evans and other proponents of 
the 7/3 proposal) argue that a bright-line rule would add to that cred 
ibility by announcing not only a long-run objective but also a short-run 
constraint on the tolerance for inflation. In my view, however, Federal 
Reserve policymakers are too sanguine about their ability to contract the 
money supply in the future in reaction to a sharp rise in loan supply by 
banks, especially if that increase were to occur alongside an increase in 
long-term interest rates. 
The experience of the 1930s shows that loan supply can jump very 
quickly following a severe banking crisis. From 1933 to 1939, total lending 
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by Federal Reserve member banks was essentially flat. From December 
1939 to December 1941, loans rose by roughly 20 percent. It is not farfetched 
to argue that a similar surge in bank lending could occur today. 
Federal Reserve officials argue that they have all the tools they need to 
contract the money supply as necessary, even though they have tripled the 
amount of high-powered money relative to its precrisis level. They point 
to the potential use of contractionary open-market operations, increases 
in the interest rate paid on excess reserves, and the use of reverse repur 
chase agreements as tools that they could employ in addition to reserve 
requirement increases. I do not find those arguments very convincing. 
The central problem that policymakers do not like to recognize is the 
political risk the Federal Reserve could face from employing some of 
these policy tools. 
Consider the problem of relying on contractionary open-market opera 
tions if bond market yields and bank loan supply both rose suddenly. 
The key problem is that significant sales of the long-term Treasuries or 
mortgage-backed securities necessarily used in such operations could, in 
an environment of substantially higher interest rates, make the Federal 
Reserve insolvent on an accounting basis (Shadow Financial Regulatory 
Committee 2010).1 Of course, such insolvency would not physically pre 
vent the Federal Reserve from contracting its balance sheet, but the pros 
pect would be a public relations nightmare. It could damage the Federal 
Reserve's image and lead to an adverse political backlash in Congress, with 
uncertain consequences. For that reason many observers worry that the 
Federal Reserve is unlikely to take on the political risks that would attend 
making itself insolvent on an accounting basis. It might instead choose to 
delay open-market sales of its assets in response to a sudden increase in 
interest rates and loan supply. In that case it would have to either accept the 
inflationary consequences of doing so or rely on other tools to lean against 
the expansion in the supply of money and loans. 
What other tools? Reverse repurchase agreements have been discussed, 
but it is far from certain that money market mutual funds would be willing 
to engage in these transactions on the necessary scale, and some market 
participants have expressed skepticism that this would be feasible. Higher 
interest on excess reserves could help to limit bank expansion of loans and 
deposits, but the elasticity of demand for excess reserves is unknown, and 
1. See also Charles W. Calomiris, "An Insurance Policy Against Inflation," The Wall 
Street Journal, March 12, 2012; Charles W. Calomiris and Ellis Tallman, "In Monetary 
Targeting, Two Tails Are Better Than One," Bloomberg Businessweek, November 18, 2010. 
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during a spike in bank loan supply the rise in interest payments to banks 
needed to entice them to avoid a surge in lending might require a very 
large expenditure by the Federal Reserve. Such an increase in interest cost, 
alongside the low interest earned on its assets, could itself produce huge 
losses at the Federal Reserve that would threaten its accounting solvency. 
In other words, in the real world where political forces do shape mon 
etary policy, the Federal Reserve's current balance sheet structure (large 
amounts of excess reserves combined with assets that will decline in value 
if long-term interest rates rise) may be an unfortunate form of "commitment 
device," where the commitment is to restricting open-market operations 
and potentially to producing undesirable inflation. Given that reality, the 
prudent thing for the Federal Reserve to do is to recognize that increased 
reserve requirements are its best tool for preventing increased inflation. 
A phasing in of increases in reserve requirements though a preannounced 
plan would be desirable because it would avoid disruptive surprises to the 
market. Given the implementation delays that will necessarily attend any 
such shift in reserve requirements, it is high time for the Federal Reserve to 
begin that process. Waiting to begin until inflation is upon us could result 
in a significant surge in inflation. 
REFERENCES FOR THE CALOMIRIS COMMENT 
Calomiris, Charles W. 2012. "Getting the Right Mix of Capital and Cash Require 
ments in Prudential Bank Regulation." Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 24: 
33-41. 
Calomiris, Charles W., Florian Heider, and Marie Hoerova. 2011. "A Theory of 
Bank Liquidity Requirements." Working paper. Columbia Business School 
(November). 
Calomiris, Charles W., Joseph R. Mason, and David C. Wheelock. 2011. "Did 
Doubling Reserve Requirements Cause the Recession of 1937-1938? A Micro 
economic Approach." Working Paper no. 16688. Cambridge, Mass.: National 
Bureau of Economic Research (January). 
Davis, Steven J., and Till von Wachter. 2011. "Recessions and the Costs of Job 
Losses." BPEA, no. 1: 1-55. 
Eggertsson, Gauti B., and Michael Woodford. 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest 
Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy." BPEA, no. 1: 139-211. 
Plosser, Charles I. 2012. "Economic Outlook and Communicating Monetary Pol 
icy." Speech at the Economic Forecast Breakfast and Annual Meeting of the 
Main Line Chamber of Commerce and the Main Line Chamber Foundation, 
Gladwyne, Pa., February 1. 
Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee. 2010. "Stress Testing the Fed." State 
ment no. 302. University of Pennsylvania (December 13). fic.wharton.upenn. 
edu/fic/Policy%20page/Statement%20No.%20302.pdf. 
This content downloaded from 128.59.154.119 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 16:18:17 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
64 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2012 
COMMENT BY 
MICHAEL WOODFORD1 This paper by Jeffrey Campbell, Charles 
Evans, Jonas Fisher, and Alejandro Justiniano addresses a very topical 
issue, namely, the role of forward guidance in the effective conduct of mon 
etary policy, with particular reference to approaches recently used or con 
templated by the Federal Reserve. Whether and how a central bank should 
communicate its likely future policy stance is always an issue, and some 
central banks, such as Sweden's Riksbank, routinely publish projected for 
ward paths for their policy rate as part of their communication strategy. But 
it becomes an especially crucial issue when, as in the United States since 
December 2008, the policy rate target is at its effective lower bound, so that 
adjustments of the current policy rate target are no longer given much con 
sideration at meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). It 
is hardly surprising that explicit statements about likely future policy have 
become a much more prominent aspect of Federal Reserve communica 
tions since that time, and debates about the desirability of such forward 
guidance have been one of the more contentious issues within the FOMC. 
The paper addresses questions of two types. First, how confident can 
one be that attempts at forward guidance matter at all? Do such statements 
by a central bank actually change the expectations of market participants, 
and hence economic outcomes, or do only the bank's actual trades matter, 
and not what it may say about them? And second, to the extent that one 
believes that this dimension of policy matters, how should it best be used? 
Is the kind of forward guidance used thus far by the FOMC the right kind? 
The authors seek to assess the effectiveness of forward guidance in influ 
encing expectations using two distinct methodologies. The first of these 
updates and extends the important previous work of Refet Giirkaynak, 
Brian Sack, and Eric Swanson (2005). This approach looks at whether 
market expectations of the forward path of short-term interest rates seem 
to change over a narrow time window (from half an hour to a full day) 
around the release of an FOMC statement; the idea is that if the window is 
narrow enough, one can be fairly confident that the only important "news" 
that should have changed expectations over this interval was the news in 
the FOMC statement. The method cannot, by its nature, reveal anything 
about why market participants forecast a different forward path for interest 
rates after release of the statement than before, or which aspect of the state 
ment constitutes the news that changes their beliefs; but it can test the null 
1. Thanks are due to Kyle Jurado for research assistance and to the National Science 
Foundation for supporting my research on this issue under grant number SES-0820438. 
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hypotheses that FOMC announcements do not change the expectations of 
market participants at all (that speech is irrelevant) or that the only news 
in a postmeeting statement is the revelation of the new (current) operating 
target for the federal funds rate. 
Giirkaynak and his coauthors use the change in the federal funds futures 
price after an FOMC announcement to infer the change in market expecta 
tions for the funds rate at various horizons. They use principal components 
analysis to extract the two most important "factors" explaining movements 
in the forecasted funds rate at the various horizons, and they orthogonalize 
these two factors so that the loading on one factor (the "target" factor) is 
equal to the change in the forecast of the current federal funds target (the 
one that will apply immediately after the meeting), while the other factor 
(the "path" factor) involves no change in the forecast of the current target, 
only changes in forecasts of the funds rate at more distant horizons. Under 
the null hypothesis of no effect of the statements on expectations, there 
should be no appreciable variation in either factor. Under the null hypoth 
esis that the only news is the revelation of the current target, all variations 
in the forecasted path of the funds rate should be accounted for by the tar 
get factor alone. Instead, Giirkaynak and coauthors find that the path factor 
accounts for an important degree of variation in funds rate forecasts. 
The present authors extend their work to a longer data sample and find 
similar results. For their sample of statements between February 1994 and 
June 2007 (that is, from the time that the FOMC began issuing a statement 
about the policy decision after each meeting until the onset of the subprime 
crisis), they find that the path factor accounts for 67 percent of the variation 
in the expected funds rate 2 quarters in the future, and 90 percent 4 quar 
ters in the future. For their sample of statements between August 2007 and 
December 2011 (treated separately because of the numerous novel aspects 
of communication policy during and since the crisis), the path factor is 
associated with changes in the expected funds rate further in the future but 
continues to be important: it accounts for 53 percent of variation in fore 
casts 4 quarters in the future, and 79 percent 6 quarters out. 
These findings indicate that FOMC announcements were able to shift 
expectations about the future path of the funds rate, and not simply through 
the announcement of a new current target. Some other aspect of the 
announcement must have been conveying information about future policy, 
over and above whatever inference about future policy could be made on 
the basis of the new funds rate target itself. These changes in expectations 
about future policy, furthermore, affected behavior, at least in asset mar 
kets, for Giirkaynak and coauthors (2005) also find that their path factor 
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is correlated with changes in Treasury yields over the same time window. 
The present authors confirm this and also find highly significant effects on 
corporate bond yields. 
As already noted, an important limitation of this approach is that it pro 
vides no information about what aspect of FOMC statements influences 
expectations. Do market participants accept at face value what the FOMC 
declares about future policy, or do they form their own inferences about 
likely FOMC policy from other clues in the statements? More important, do 
their forecasts of the future funds rate change because the statement changes 
their beliefs about the FOMC's reaction function, or because it changes their 
forecasts of economic conditions that are expected to determine FOMC pol 
icy change, as a result of inferences they make from the statement about 
information available to the FOMC? The latter question—to use the authors' 
terminology, whether the guidance provided by the statements is Odyssean 
or Delphic—is important for determining whether statements can change 
expectations about the way that a central bank will conduct policy in the 
future, which is the goal of forward guidance. 
In at least some cases, the forecast changes do coincide with attempts 
by the FOMC to provide explicit forward guidance about policy. For 
example, the largest value of Giirkaynak and coauthors' (2005) path fac 
tor occurred on January 28, 2004, following an FOMC meeting at which 
the funds rate target (which had been held constant at a floor of 1 percent 
since the previous June) was not changed, but the reference to maintain 
ing policy accommodation "for a considerable period," included in each 
postmeeting statement since the previous August, was replaced by a dec 
laration that "the Committee believes it can be patient in removing policy 
accommodation." It seems likely that the substantial change in funds rate 
expectations, despite no change in the current target and no surprise in that 
regard, was mainly due to this change in language, which was evidently 
taken to indicate that the FOMC would begin raising the funds rate target 
sooner than had previously been expected. But even in such a case, one 
cannot easily say whether this response reflected successful signaling of a 
change in the FOMC's reaction function, or simply an inference that the 
change in language indicated that the FOMC's information predicted a 
stronger economy. 
Reasons for doubt are provided by the results presented in this paper on 
the extent to which the news in FOMC statements predicts changes from 
month to month in Blue Chip Economic Indicators forecasts of unemploy 
ment and consumer price inflation. The authors find that positive values 
of both the target factor and the path factor are associated with downward 
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revisions of unemployment forecasts, and upward revisions of inflation 
forecasts, in the next month's Blue Chip survey after the FOMC statement 
in question. Both signs are opposite to what one would expect if the news 
that led to a higher expected path of the federal funds rate was a shift in 
the FOMC reaction function toward tighter policy under given economic 
conditions, but they are exactly what one would expect if there were no 
change in beliefs about the reaction function, but instead there was news 
that the economy was likely to be stronger than previously expected. Of 
course, there could be some news of both kinds, but one cannot say that 
these results provide clear evidence of an ability to change beliefs about 
the reaction function. 
The authors propose to remedy some of the obvious limitations of 
Giirkaynak and coauthors' (2005) event-study methodology by also using 
a second approach. This approach uses survey forecasts of future interest 
rates, inflation, and unemployment at various horizons to measure forecast 
able deviations from a Taylor-type reaction function. (As before, the 
market forecasts of the future federal funds rate path are inferred from 
federal funds futures prices, and forecasts of inflation and unemployment 
are taken from the Blue Chip survey.) The existence of forecastable devia 
tions from a simple Taylor rule (that is, funds rate forecasts different from 
those that should be implied by the inflation and unemployment forecasts, 
if one expected the funds rate to be set in the future using a linear function 
of inflation and unemployment) is interpreted as indicating the existence 
of effective forward guidance. The authors call the innovations in these 
forecastable departures "forward guidance shocks"; once such shocks can 
be measured, one can then consider their effects on other variables to deter 
mine whether forward guidance successfully influences anything besides 
the expected path of the federal funds rate. 
The authors find that substantial forecastable deviations from the 
Taylor rule exist: more than 80 percent of the variation in the residual of 
the Taylor rule is attributed to forward guidance shocks 1 to 4 quarters 
earlier, and about 40 percent to shocks as early as 3 to 4 quarters earlier. 
The authors argue on this ground that "the public and the FOMC together 
have extensive experience with the communication of relatively short 
term forward guidance." They also find, as with the path factor identified 
using Giirkaynak and coauthors' methodology, that their forward guidance 
shocks are associated with changes in yields on Treasuries and corporate 
bonds. They conclude that "it seems possible for the FOMC to influence 
longer-term interest rates that are outside of its direct control by communi 
cating its intention to lower the short-term policy rate persistently." 
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The authors appear to believe that identifying movements in forecasts 
of Taylor rule residuals, rather than simply forecasts of the future federal 
funds rate, solves the problem of distinguishing forward guidance from 
mere news about the economic outlook. But this is only true to the extent 
that one can be confident that people's beliefs about the FOMC reaction 
function, in the absence of forward guidance, are correctly specified by the 
particular Taylor rule that the authors use. If they are not, then even in the 
absence of any change in beliefs about the reaction function, news about 
the economic outlook could result in changed forecasts for the residual of 
the (incorrectly specified) Taylor rule. 
In fact, the results in table 9 of the paper suggest an interpretation of the 
latter kind. The authors find that positive forward guidance shocks identi 
fied using their method (supposedly, signals that the FOMC will deviate 
from its normal reaction function a quarter or two later, in the direction 
of tighter policy than usual) are correlated with downward revisions in 
unemployment forecasts for the next few quarters. This is the opposite of 
the conclusion that ought to be drawn from news that the current FOMC 
is more "hawkish" than past committees have typically been. The authors 
themselves provide a potential interpretation of the finding, in terms of 
what they call a "history-dependent" reaction function. Under this more 
complex policy (their equation 4), a decrease in unemployment results in a 
larger increase in the funds rate target if the decrease was not forecastable 
a couple of quarters earlier than if it was forecastable. 
The authors draw a distinction between this kind of interpretation 
of the results in table 9 and what they call "simple reverse causality" 
from unemployment to the policy rate. But it is in fact an explanation 
in terms of reverse causality—albeit one that involves a more complex 
dynamic relationship between unemployment and the target rate than 
the one specified in their baseline reaction function. More to the point, 
it is an explanation that undermines their desired interpretation of the v,; 
shocks as "forward guidance shocks." If equation 4 correctly describes 
FOMC policy, the identified residual vu will reflect changes in the 
forecast of m,+1 over the course of quarter t, even in the absence of any 
true stochastic shifts in the reaction function. Since it is surely the case 
thaf ut+] (which is actually an average of the unemployment rate over 
quarters t through t + 2, as estimated at the beginning of quarter t + 2) 
will not be completely forecastable by the beginning of quarter t, the 
variation in this residual would surely be an overestimate of the actual 
degree of forecastable departure from the typical reaction function (that 
is, from equation 4 with no stochastic terms). And significant variation 
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in this residual need not imply the existence of true forward guidance 
shocks at all. 
Moreover, even if one supposes that the forward guidance shocks that 
the authors identify really do represent changes in expectations about 
future deviations from the FOMC's usual reaction function, evidence 
that such changes in policy expectations occur would not in itself prove 
that the FOMC has been able to control those expectations through its 
announcements. This second method of the authors, given that it is based 
on monthly data rather than data from a window of hours or days, can at 
best identify only the changes in policy expectations that occur during a 
given month, regardless of the reasons for the changes in beliefs; there is 
no reason to tie them to FOMC announcements, and certainly no reason 
to tie them to the FOMC's deliberate attempts to influence beliefs about 
its policy, as opposed to developments that "reveal the type" of the current 
FOMC, possibly inadvertently. 
One must therefore conclude that the authors provide little direct 
evidence that the FOMC is able to change expectations about its future 
policy when it wishes to. In particular, although I believe that FOMC 
statements have been able to change market forecasts of the path of the 
funds rate, it is not clear that they have done so by changing beliefs 
about the FOMC's reaction function, as opposed to changing beliefs 
about the economic outlook. I do not think, however, that there is evi 
dence that the FOMC would not be able to change beliefs about its sys 
tematic approach to policy were it to speak about this. Instead, there 
have been few if any occasions on which such Odyssean forward guid 
ance has been attempted. 
As the paper documents, the FOMC has for some time offered various 
types of hints about the likelihood of future adjustments of its federal funds 
rate target. Since the funds rate reached the zero lower bound in December 
2008, these statements have been much more explicit (and refer to policy 
rates much further in the future) than had previously been the case. None 
theless, the FOMC's communication about future policy—both through its 
postmeeting press releases and through the information about individual 
participants' forecasts of the funds rate path provided in the quarterly 
Survey of Economic Projections—has taken only the form of predictions 
about the future path of the funds rate, given what can be known at pres 
ent. No indication of a decision to change the FOMC's policy rule is ever 
given; it is thus always possible to interpret the FOMC's announcements 
about future policy as simply reflecting changes in the FOMC's view of 
likely future economic conditions, and hence the path of the funds rate 
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that can be expected under the committee's normal reaction function. For 
example, when the FOMC announced on January 25, 2012, that "the Com 
mittee . . . currently anticipates that economic conditions . . . are likely to 
warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through 
late 2014"—arguably the Committee's most aggressive use of forward 
guidance in its history—the headline of the New York Times online story 
about the announcement was "Fed Signals That a Full Recovery Is Years 
Away.'" Although the shift in the OIS (overnight index swap) yield curve 
indicates that market forecasts of the funds rate several years in the future 
fell after the announcement, this might have been a response to expecta 
tions of a slower recovery rather than to any understanding that FOMC 
policy had changed. 
Is this not the only prudent form of forward guidance for a central 
bank to offer? If one supposes that the only alternative would have been 
for the FOMC to offer an explicit promise to keep the funds rate target at 
zero to 25 basis points until late in 2014, then one might think so; a non 
state-contingent commitment extending almost 3 years into the future 
would surely have been unwise. The resort to a mere prediction might 
seem a clever way of allowing for state contingency without having to 
explain all the possible contingencies; the FOMC would be saying what 
the path of the funds rate will be if things develop in the way that can be 
anticipated given what it knows now, while making it clear that this is 
only the committee's current anticipation—policy may have to be differ 
ent if unexpected developments arise. 
It is certainly right that a desirable form of forward guidance—if it 
involves communication about anything but a fairly short horizon—would 
not make unconditional promises about the future path of the funds rate. 
Since the authors refer to the "late 2014" statement language as implement 
ing "the policy recommendations of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)," I 
should point out that Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) do not argue for 
the desirability of a commitment to keep the policy rate at zero for a fixed 
period. Rather, we argue for the desirability of a commitment to conduct 
2. The New York Times, January 25, 2012 (www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ 
economy/ fed-to-maintain-rates-near-zero-through-late-2014.html?pagewanted=all). 
The Federal Reserve itself took some pains to deny that it was attempting to provide 
Odyssean forward guidance through its statement. Chairman Ben Bernanke was quoted in 
the Times article as saying during the press conference following the release of the statement, 
"I wouldn't overstate the Fed's ability to massively change expectations through its state 
ments," although, he offered, "it's important for us to say what we think." 
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policy in a different way than a discretionary central banker would wish 
to ex post, and we show that (in our New Keynesian model) the optimal 
commitment involves keeping the policy rate at zero for some time after 
the point at which a forward-looking inflation-targeting central bank (or a 
central bank following a forward-looking Taylor rule) would begin to raise 
interest rates. But the date T until which the policy rate should be kept at 
zero is not a date that can be announced with certainty at the time of the 
shock that causes the zero lower bound to bind; its optimal value depends 
on how the economy develops. (In the same paper we illustrate numerically 
how T should depend on the length of time that the natural rate of interest 
remains abnormally low, and we give a more general analytical character 
ization of the optimal policy commitment that implies that T should depend 
on the evolution of "cost-push" disturbances as well.) 
But does this mean that, as a practical matter, mere communication of 
the forward path that the central bank currently forecasts—given the cur 
rently anticipated path of the economy and the policy rule that the bank 
intends to follow—is all that is likely to be useful? Unfortunately, such 
an approach has a serious flaw, which is precisely that a given statement 
about the change in the anticipated forward path of the policy rate may be 
subject to multiple interpretations. If an announcement that the date T at 
which the policy rate will first rise above its lower bound has moved fur 
ther into the future is interpreted as meaning that the first date at which a 
standard (purely forward-looking) Taylor rule would require a policy rate 
above the floor has moved further into the future, because of a weakening 
of the economic outlook—without in any way challenging the expectation 
that the bank will, as always, follow such a rule—then the announcement 
(if also believed) should have a contractionary, not an expansionary, effect 
on aggregate demand. For rather than implying that, at a certain point in 
the future, interest rates will be held lower than one would have expected 
before the announcement (so that real incomes at that later time will be 
greater than would previously have been expected, and likely inflation as 
well), the announcement would instead imply that real incomes at that time 
will be lower than would previously have been expected (and likely infla 
tion as well). Such a change in expectations should reduce current willing 
ness to spend rather than increase it. Forward guidance of this kind would 
thus have a perverse effect, worse than not commenting on the outlook for 
future interest rates at all. 
The only obvious way to avoid this pitfall is to accompany any discus 
sion of the forward path of interest rates with an explanation of the con 
siderations behind it—in particular, of the policy commitments that the 
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anticipated forward path reflects. Discussion of the forward path of interest 
rates implied by a central bank's policy commitments may well be use 
ful; in many New Keynesian models, anticipations of this forward path 
are a key element in the transmission mechanism, and a central bank may 
reasonably not wish to leave it to chance whether market participants will 
correctly understand the interest rate implications of policy commitments 
formulated in other terms (say, in terms of acceptable paths for the price 
level and the unemployment rate). But this does not mean that presentation 
of the implied forward path for interest rates suffices as an explanation of 
the bank's policy commitments. 
In the case of a central bank at the lower bound for its policy rate, it 
is important to discuss what will determine the date T at which "liftoff" 
from the floor should occur, and not simply announce the bank's current 
estimate (or range of estimates) of that date. The authors suggest one 
simple form that such an explanation might take, in their reference to the 
"7/3 threshold rule" proposed by Evans. Adoption of such a commitment 
by the FOMC would, in my view, be an important improvement upon 
current communication policy. It would emphasize the conditions for exit 
from the current extremely accommodative policy stance, rather than an 
exit date. And the stated conditions would involve both parts of the Fed 
eral Reserve's dual legislative mandate, which I believe is also desirable. 
(The optimal target criterion derived in Eggertsson and Woodford 2003 
involves the evolution of both an index of the general level of prices and 
a measure of the output gap.) 
Nonetheless, the Evans proposal fails to incorporate an important fea 
ture of the optimal policy commitment in the model of Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2003), which also characterizes optimal commitments in more 
general (and more realistic) New Keynesian models for reasons discussed 
in Woodford (2011). That feature is the commitment to compensate sub 
sequently for misses of the target due to the binding zero lower bound on 
interest rate policy. The 7/3 threshold rule is an example of a purely forward 
looking criterion for policy: the appropriate policy at any time depends 
only on the paths for inflation and unemployment that can be achieved 
from that time onward, independent of the path by which the economy may 
have reached its current state. In the context of the simple macroeconomic 
model considered by Eggertsson and Woodford (where inflation and output 
determination are also purely forward looking), such a rule will not imply 
any reason to delay immediately returning to the low-inflation steady state 
as soon as this is consistent with the zero lower bound on interest rates 
(that is, as soon as the natural rate of interest returns to positive territory); 
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it would not imply any commitment to keep the policy rate low for longer 
than would a strict inflation target or a purely contemporaneous Taylor rule. 
This means that a credible commitment to such a rule would do nothing to 
mitigate the problems created by the zero lower bound—which, in a case 
like the numerical example presented by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), 
are quite severe. 
A more desirable form of policy commitment would instead involve a 
commitment to more-inflationary policy for a time, to offset any period of 
insufficient nominal growth while the zero lower bound constrains pol 
icy. If such a commitment is made credible, the expectation that it will be 
adhered to reduces automatically the risks of deflation or even of signifi 
cant disinflation while the lower bound binds, because any undershooting 
of nominal growth should automatically create expectations of more-rapid 
future nominal growth that provide a motive for smaller price reductions 
and more modest reductions in expenditure immediately. Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2003) show numerically that commitment to a fixed target path 
for an "[output] gap-adjusted price level" (the log of the price index plus 
a positive multiple of a measure of the output gap) provides a fairly good 
approximation to the optimal policy commitment in their model. A sim 
pler version of such a proposal—and one that would maintain some of the 
important advantages of the Eggertsson-Woodford proposal, while being 
easier to explain to the public—would be a target path for nominal GDP, 
as proposed by Christina Romer, among others.3 It would have been inter 
esting to see simulations of the effects of practical policy proposals of this 
kind compared with those of a commitment to the 7/3 threshold rule, using 
the authors' DSGE model. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION David Romer saw the paper's distinction 
between types of central bank statements—between those that provide 
information about the central bank's outlook, and those that indicate a depar 
ture from the central bank's usual response to a change in the outlook— 
as one of first-order importance. However, he also thought the discussants 
had made an important clarification, namely, that one reason a central 
bank might depart from its usual response is that it has other objectives 
in addition to the standard ones of price stability and maximum employ 
ment. During the 1980s, for example, under the Paris and Louvre Accords, 
the Federal Reserve was concerned with exchange rate objectives. This, 
Romer argued, was different from departing from usual behavior because 
one has made an Odyssean commitment. 
On the question of whether the Federal Reserve's recent forward guid 
ance was Odyssean, Romer pointed out that the plain language of the 
Fed's statements did not support such an interpretation. Those statements 
said explicitly that forecast economic conditions were what warranted low 
interest rates well into the future; the policy would change if conditions 
changed. Whether those statements also contained a dog-whistle compo 
nent, signaling to those in the know that an Odyssean statement was being 
made, was a harder question to answer. 
Finally, Romer offered the prediction that the paper's identification of 
central bank commitments to departures from its interest rate rule would 
not turn out to be the definitive one. As evidence he cited the fact that 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, when the Federal Reserve seemed to be 
concerned largely with output and inflation, the authors found, implausibly, 
that in every quarter the Fed was communicating deviations from its rule. 
Responding to Calomiris's formal comment, Robert Hall argued that 
Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott had demonstrated long ago that a cen 
tral bank that cannot commit to future actions is doomed to make on-the 
spot decisions that lead to higher inflation. Ever since then, central banks 
around the world have taken pains to avoid that trap, and in doing so have 
shown that central banks can indeed commit. Therefore it was wrong to 
suggest, as Calomiris had, that such commitments are merely cheap talk, 
and it was unnecessary to propose that central banks make their commit 
ments credible by expanding their balance sheets. In any event, Hall con 
tinued, in the case of the Federal Reserve, such an expansion would not 
make a commitment to easier policy more credible, because the Fed can 
engage in monetary contraction any time it wants by paying higher inter 
est on reserves. Indeed, Chairman Bernanke has made it clear that he is 
prepared to do just that. 
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Hall also commented on what he saw as a surprising resurgence of inter 
est in nominal GDP targeting, perhaps due primarily to Christina Romer's 
work. He recalled that soon after Kydland and Prescott's paper was pub 
lished, he and Gregory Mankiw had written a paper on that topic. They 
had undertaken the project thinking that they could show that commitment 
to such a target might be the best way for a central bank to communicate 
its objectives. But they soon found that there were so many medium-run 
sources of disturbance to real GDP that nominal GDP targeting seemed 
impractical. 
Benjamin Friedman saw the paper as an attempt to resolve a conundrum 
that James Tobin had often struggled with: although economists know that 
the monetary policy rule that optimizes a central bank's chosen objectives 
will be highly state-contingent, and thus complex, the effectiveness of any 
such rule requires that it be simple enough to be understood by the public. 
This gives rise to a trade-off between flexibility and simplicity that is very 
difficult to optimize. 
Friedman accepted the distinction between Delphic forecasts and 
Odyssean commitments but thought the authors erred in strictly linking 
the former to what they called the systematic component of the interest 
rate setting procedure, and the latter to the deviation component. In fact, 
Friedman argued, the central bank could state a forecast of either the sys 
tematic or the deviation component, and similarly, it could state a commit 
ment, which could be conditional or unconditional, either with respect to 
the deviation component or to the sum of the two components—it would be 
illogical, of course, to "commit" with respect to the systematic component. 
Friedman thought that relaxing that one-to-one identification could help 
the authors address the difficulties that both discussants had found with the 
paper's analysis. 
Alan Blinder applauded Charles Evans for his willingness to reveal his 
thoughts on monetary policy to the Brookings Panel while still a member 
of the Federal Open Market Committee, for his dovish policy stance rela 
tive to the current FOMC spectrum, and for championing the view that 
any future exit from expansionary policy should be based on actual eco 
nomic conditions rather than the calendar. That said. Blinder questioned 
the paper's implication that there exists a single, invariant Taylor rule on 
which the committee focuses. He recalled from his own FOMC tenure 
that the committee looked at as many as a dozen variations of the Taylor 
rule, whose prescriptions for the federal funds rate often differed across a 
range of 150 basis points—at a time when the incremental change in the 
rate under discussion was usually 25 basis points. 
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Blinder also expressed skepticism about the Chicago Federal Reserve 
Bank's macroeconomic model. That model, like others in the class of mod 
els to which it belongs, uses the rational expectations hypothesis of the term 
structure to nail down how a policy commitment to a particular short-term 
interest rate for a period of time affects long-term rates. Although plausible 
as theory, empirical analysis has found this view of the term structure to be 
completely wrong: it has never been shown to hold in any country for any 
period longer than a quarter or two. 
David Romer, responding to Blinder's first point, proposed that econo 
mists henceforth use the term "interest rate rule" instead of "Taylor rule." 
One is less tempted to put a "the" in front of the latter, he observed. 
Donald Kohn agreed with Romer that the Federal Reserve's forward 
guidance to date has been intended not as announcing a deviation from its 
chosen interest rate rule, but rather as clarifying what the interest rate rule 
was and how the Fed views the economic outlook. Kohn also noted that no 
central bank to date has adopted an Odyssean commitment strategy, and he 
suggested that the reasons were at least twofold. One is simple uncertainty: 
the economy could change in ways that were unforeseen when the com 
mitment was made. The other is central banks' reluctance to undermine 
their hard-won credibility as inflation fighters: any deliberate overshooting 
of the inflation target might destroy or at least erode that credibility, which 
would likely prove expensive to restore. 
Bradford DeLong suggested that the balance sheet problem cited by 
Hall could be avoided if the Federal Reserve purchased less liquid assets. 
If, for example, instead of Treasury bills and mortgage-backed securi 
ties, the Fed invested in physical infrastructure, or student loans, or basic 
biomedical research, those positions would be less easily reversed and 
thus support a more credible commitment. Expansionary monetary policy 
would in effect substitute for expansionary fiscal policy, as had been argued 
by Gauti Eggertsson and Michael Woodford in their 2003 Brookings Paper, 
or indeed by Jacob Viner in the 1930s. 
Refet Giirkaynak claimed that the Federal Reserve did in fact provide 
Odyssean forward guidance in one recent episode. Concerns about defla 
tion in 2003-05 led the FOMC to say explicitly that it would keep inter 
est rates low for a longer period than the markets were expecting. Indeed, 
many now place blame for the housing bubble on what they see as large 
deviations from the Taylor rule during that period. But, Giirkaynak argued, 
the reason the Federal Reserve kept interest rates so low during that period 
is that it had committed itself, or saw that it was perceived as having 
committed itself, to that policy, so that it became a matter of maintaining 
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credibility. An interesting question, then, was whether, looking back, that 
episode should be seen as a success. 
Laurence Meyer expressed dismay that Federal Reserve officials would 
even suggest that there was any uncertainty about whether the Fed's for 
ward guidance was perceived as a commitment or as a forecast. Meyer 
himself had recently surveyed 100 market participants, 98 of whom under 
stood it to be a forecast. He thought the real topic of interest in the paper 
was Evans's 7/3 proposal, which Meyer viewed as effectively calling on 
the Federal Reserve to commit itself unconditionally to keeping interest 
rates unchanged until the unemployment rate fell to 7 percent—in his view 
there was no chance that inflation would rise above 3 percent during the 
relevant period, so that part of the proposal was moot. For his part, Meyer 
believed that the FOMC would never make such an unconditional com 
mitment. What he thought had happened in the recent episode was that the 
Federal Reserve had surprised the markets by revising its policy rule, as 
Evans had urged, to place greater emphasis on the unemployment objective 
relative to the price stability objective. 
Michael Kiley thought it useful to clarify that a commitment strategy 
means one in which it is the reputation of the policymaker that is being 
used to influence market behavior. In his view a better taxonomy might 
be that of V. V. Chari, Patrick Kehoe, and Edward Prescott, who in a 1989 
paper had distinguished between optimal policy under discretion and opti 
mal policy under commitment and postulated a continuum between those 
two extremes. Kiley agreed with Michael Woodford that the paper should 
also consider simulations that test the effectiveness of their proposed strate 
gies in response to a downward shock to inflation and economic activity; 
the paper at present examined only the risks to the upside. 
Looking at the paper's empirical estimates of the impact of Odyssean 
forward guidance, Eric Swanson observed that several of the results were 
puzzling or had the wrong sign, as the authors themselves had recognized. 
He suggested that the problem was one of identification, and specifically 
the fact that the Odyssean component was measured as a residual, so that 
whatever was not Delphic was identified as Odyssean by default. Swanson 
was reminded of Robert Solow's well-known total factor productivity 
residual, which some have called "a measure of our ignorance." In fact, 
the authors' residual might be capturing not only the effects of Odyssean 
commitment but also errors due to model misspecification, differences in 
Taylor rules, and other influences. Swanson argued further that the Federal 
Reserve's recent forward guidance surely did have at least some commit 
ment aspect. In particular, there seemed to be widespread agreement, in the 
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press and elsewhere, that the Fed would now find it more difficult to raise 
interest rates than if it had never issued the guidance. To the extent that this 
was true, it was exactly the Eggertsson-Woodford story. This was also the 
case, he suggested, for the 2003-05 episode cited by Giirkaynak. 
Responding to DeLong, Swanson argued that the fact noted by Hall, 
that the Federal Reserve can raise the interest rate on reserves, made it 
irrelevant whether the Fed purchased liquid or illiquid assets. By changing 
the interest rate paid on reserves, the Fed could tighten policy as quickly 
and by as much as it desired whatever the size or composition of the assets 
on its balance sheet. DeLong replied that although from a strictly economic 
perspective Swanson was correct, his point was that the Federal Reserve 
would encounter political difficulties if it realized large capital losses from 
the sale of illiquid assets, or if it ran large operating losses. To the extent the 
Fed responded to these political considerations, purchases of illiquid assets 
could still have a commitment effect. 
Frederic Mishkin offered an example of why it was dangerous to inter 
pret apparent deviations from a Taylor rule as a commitment. In late 2007 
the economy was performing well, yet the Federal Reserve started to lower 
interest rates. That might have been interpreted as a deviation from the 
interest rate rule, and thus as a commitment to depart from standard policy, 
but in fact the Fed's forecast had changed dramatically, and its lowering 
of interest rates was intended as a normal policy response to that change. 
Mishkin also thought the paper should distinguish more clearly between 
management of expectations and commitment. Managing public expecta 
tions is part of normal Federal Reserve policymaking, and it can do this in 
various standard ways, or it can manage expectations through commitment. 
Noting that the paper cited recent Federal Reserve estimates of the 
NAIRU (non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment), Mishkin com 
mented that those estimates remain highly uncertain, and in his view the Fed 
has not emphasized that uncertainty as much as it should. Lastly, Mishkin 
expressed misgivings about the use of 3 percent as a comfort zone for the 
inflation rate: if it became widely understood that the Fed considers 3 per 
cent annual inflation acceptable, that could easily be misinterpreted as the 
Fed's new target for inflation, leading to an adverse expectations dynamic 
that could actually harm economic performance. 
Jan Hatzius observed that although the authors and the discussants had 
some important differences of opinion, all of them had had positive things 
to say about nominal GDP targeting, at least at some level. That observers 
from both sides of the political spectrum could agree that there was some 
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thing to be said for such a policy made him hopeful that it might serve as a 
basis for some sort of convergence in the future. 
Christopher Sims pointed out that whether the Federal Reserve's state 
ments are interpreted as Delphic or Odyssean, the evidence is clear that the 
Fed's announcements do have effects on markets, and that implies that the 
Fed has an information advantage over market participants. Thus, under 
either interpretation, there is room for discretionary monetary policy, which 
would not be the case if the Fed did not know anything that the markets do 
not already know. 
Sims disagreed, however, with those who said that the Federal Reserve 
can always switch to a contractionary policy, no matter how large its bal 
ance sheet, just by raising interest rates. What might give the Fed pause 
in such circumstances, he argued, was not its own balance sheet but the 
Treasury's: given today's large federal debt, any sharp rise in interest rates 
would have a dramatic effect on federal interest expenditure, exceeding 
any seen in the postwar period. At a minimum that would have unpredict 
able political consequences for the Fed. Such a scenario might be of even 
greater concern in Europe: the European Central Bank's balance sheet has 
likewise been greatly expanded, yet unlike in the United States the politi 
cal repercussions of its raising interest rates would be spread over a large 
number of uncoordinated fiscal policymakers. 
Andrew Levin returned to Michael Kiley's point about the continuum 
between discretion and commitment. Perfect commitment, he argued, 
is possible only for a Ramsey policymaker who has complete author 
ity, lives forever, and communicates perfectly and with complete cred 
ibility. Such a policymaker does not exist in the real world. The United 
States, for example, has periodic elections, and the president appoints 
and the Congress confirms the Federal Reserve chairman and many of 
the FOMC members. Hence the Fed cannot commit itself for any period 
longer than a few years. This absence of an immortal monetary autocrat 
may be bad from an economic perspective but is surely good from a 
political one: we value democracy. This limit to the ability to commit 
does not, however, mean that any stated commitment by the Fed is just 
cheap talk: in the United States as in most of the industrialized world, a 
strong democratic consensus has formed behind the institution of inde 
pendent central banks. For Levin the question was whether the central 
bank can articulate its favored policies in a way that strengthens that 
consensus, thus allowing it to move further along the continuum toward 
optimal commitment. 
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Responding to the discussion, Charles Evans acknowledged that the 
paper's analysis of Delphic versus Odyssean statements was not intended 
as a pure decomposition, but rather was an attempt to get at an impor 
tant distinction, namely, between what part of any effect of the Federal 
Reserve's forward guidance represents the announcement of a change in 
its outlook and what part represents something beyond that. An impor 
tant point, Evans thought, was that adopting state-contingent policies does 
make a great deal of sense given that one cannot easily separate the Del 
phic from the Odyssean. 
Evans defended the 7/3 threshold as an attempt to control for inflation 
risk while trying with the other hand to stimulate the economy. It is also an 
admission that we do not know exactly what the right model of the economy 
is. Evans recalled that he had recently attended an ECB meeting in Frankfurt 
where the claim was made that economists are so enamored of their models 
that they come to believe that the world works just as their models describe. 
When his turn came to speak, Evans had countered that although to him 
the real-world evidence today cried out for more monetary accommodation, 
the purpose of economic modeling was precisely to identify the factors that 
could render that conclusion wrong. The great thing about a model, in his 
view, was that it can be put on the table and dissected, and areas of disagree 
ment can be specified and debated. In the absence of a shared model like 
that which the Federal Reserve Board staff prepare for every FOMC meet 
ing, participants have a free pass to criticize various policy options without 
having to back up their views. Finally, Evans noted, given that one has to 
have a model of the economy, that model has to include monetary policy 
itself: there has to be a response function of some kind, and it has to be one 
that can survive confrontation with the data. 
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